Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies
Appendix to Safeguards Information Paper
(Updated April 2014)
- North Korea made weapons-grade plutonium using a research reactor and a reprocessing plant in defiance of its NPT obligations. In 2006, 2009 and February 2013 it exploded nuclear devices.
- In 2002 Iran's previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry, which established that it appeared to be in violation of its NPT safeguards agreement. It has continued uranium enrichment in defiance of the UN Security Council.
- Iraq to 1991 attempted to enrich indigenous uranium to weapons-grade material, in violation of NPT and Safeguards obligations.
- Syria constructed a nuclear reactor in breach of its NPT obligations.
Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort requiring the IAEA to attempt to detect them.
Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making more use of the provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements, for example. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities.
However, inspections in Iraq following the 1991 UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, and it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment program, as well as a nuclear weapons design program.
The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve. (See the section on Addressing Undeclared Nuclear Activities in the main safeguards paper.)
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) provides an example of safeguards succeeding in their aim of detecting violations of non-proliferation obligations – in this case one of long standing. It was subsequently brought to the attention of the international community, with diplomatic pressure being applied through the UN Security Council.
The DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the then USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992. This delay was apparently related to the presence of US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, which were withdrawn in 1992. IAEA inspections then showed up some problems.
During that period, in late 1985, North Korea brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled "Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt at Yongbyon, on the west coast 55 km north of Pyongyang. It exhibited all the features of a plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes and produced only about 5 MWe. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe) at Yongbyon, and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe) at Taechon, 25 km north of Yongbyon.
In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant at Yongbyon for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. The existence of the plant was revealed by IAEA inspectors. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT on some pretext and use the plutonium for weapons.
One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear material in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared. This suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required under the IAEA's Statute) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.
In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.
Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor remained under close surveillance and any plans to separate plutonium from them were deferred, in the event, for eight years.
Following bilateral negotiations between DPRK and the USA, and the conclusion of the agreed framework in October 1994, the IAEA was given additional responsibilities. The agreement required a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA was responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities were eventually dismantled. The DPRK remained uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and did not comply with its safeguards agreement, though apparently no further work was done on the two larger reactors at Yongbyon and Taechon.
Iraq was defeated in a war, which gave the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons program as part of the cease-fire conditions. The DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It could scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either have been ineffective, or risk provoking war.
Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to halt its nuclear weapons program in the 1990s in exchange, under the agreed framework, for about $US5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors. There was also the prospect of diplomatic and economic relations with the USA.
Light-water reactors offered
At the end of 1999 The long-awaited contract to build two 1000 MWe light-water reactors was signed, enabling construction to begin. The agreement was between the Korean peninsula Economic Development Organisation (KEDO) – the international organisation in charge of the project – and the South Korean utility KEPCO, bringing technology to build a nuclear power plant which is not amenable to misuse. KEDO was set up following the 1994 deal involving the USA to head off the production of weapons plutonium from the small gas-graphite reactor and to provide much needed energy – in the short term fuel oil, but eventually electricity.
The Korean Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP) reactors were the same as those then being built in South Korea, and were expected to be completed in 2008. South Korea committed to provide US$ 3.22 billion for the US$ 4.6 billion project, with Japan contributing US$ 1 billion and the EU most of the balance.
In August 2002, with the project running several years behind schedule due to North Korea's continued lack of cooperation with the IAEA in verifying the history of its nuclear program, first concrete for the two-unit nuclear power plant was poured at Kumho, on the east coast. This formal start of construction was a milestone for KEDO, which planned to deliver the main components in 2005. The work would then stop unless North Korea was fully compliant with IAEA requirements regarding verification of past activities (specifically, that all nuclear material held by North Korea has been declared and placed under safeguards).
Plutonium program revived
In December 2002 DPRK removed the IAEA seals on its facilities at Yongbyon and ordered the IAEA inspectors out of the country. It then restarted its small reactor and commenced reprocessing the 8000 irradiated fuel rods to recover weapons-grade plutonium. In April 2003 it withdrew from the NPT - the first country to do so.
Since 2003 negotiations have been intermittently under way to secure some agreement on curtailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. These have involved China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the USA, which insisted upon "complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's weapons programs" through "diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework involving those states with the most direct stakes in the outcome."
Construction of the new nuclear power reactors under KEDO was suspended late in 2003, and this suspension was renewed in 2004 and 2005. The KEDO board formally terminated the project in May 2006. Most of the fabrication of steam generators, pressure vessels and other equipment for both reactors was complete. This equipment could be sold off to other nuclear projects, including South Korean export ones.
In October 2006 DPRK tested a nuclear weapon underground near Gilju in the north east of the country, and the whole matter was referred to the UN Security Council.
After several attempts at negotiation, in February 2007 agreement with DPRK was reached in the six-party talks involving China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the USA. This involved DPRK agreeing to shut down and seal the Yongbyon reactor and related facilities including reprocessing plant within 60 days (by 14 April) and accepting IAEA monitoring of this, in return for assistance with its energy needs. Further assistance would follow the irreversible disabling of the reactor and all other nuclear facilities. The April 14 deadline was missed. After further diplomatic efforts, the reactor was shut down in mid July 2007 and an IAEA team was able to verify this and in addition, that other nuclear facilities at the site were also closed, notably the reprocessing plant ("Radiochemical Laboratory") and fuel fabrication plant. These were sealed and were to be subject to ongoing monitoring by IAEA. It was proposed to send the used fuel to Mayak in Russia or Sellafield in UK for reprocessing (required because the used fuel elements were chemically unstable). Any separated plutonium would not be repatriated.
The second phase of measures under the February 2007 agreement involved establishing a full inventory of nuclear materials and actually disabling the offending plants - initially promised by end of December 2007 but dragged out to June 2008 and then marked by demolition of Yongbyon's cooling tower. Phase 3 would be when North Korea hands over fissile materials and weapons gear. North Korea has raised the question of reviving the KEDO project for building a light water reactor.
In September 2008 North Korea refused to accept verification procedures and threatened to restart its Yongbyon reprocessing plant. The six parties met in December 2008 but did not reach agreement on verification, though removal of fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor continued. Since then North Korea has expelled IAEA inspectors, restarted reprocessing at Yongbyon, and in May 2009 it exploded another nuclear device underground, possibly more successfully than 2006, with yield of about 2 kilotonnes TNT (cf Hiroshima 15 kt).
In February 2013 North Korea exploded a third nuclear device underground, with slightly higher yield than the earlier ones. It is not clear whether it used uranium or plutonium.
In May 2013 it appeared that the Yongbyon reactor was being prepared for recommissioning. A new cooling system for the reactor had been built and two tanks holding use fuel had been covered. Activity at the site continued. In September 2013 there were indications that the reactor might have restarted.
In October 2002 it emerged that DPRK had been working clandestinely to enrich uranium for weapons use, using centrifuge equipment. There appeared to be some linkage to Pakistan's centrifuge program and in 2005 Pakistan confirmed that its Khan network had supplied P2 centrifuges to DPRK in 1990s. The scope of this program remained unknown then, and in 2009 the official DPRK news agency announced that uranium enrichment tests had been carried out successfully and the process was in its final stage.
The question about uranium enrichment capacity was unresolved through these negotiations. In November 2010 it was confirmed that since 2008, some 2000 centrifuges had been set up in a building at Yongbyon, on the site of a fuel fabrication facility. The centrifuges appear to be Pakistani P2 types and their purpose is unknown, though North Korea says that they are producing only low-enriched uranium. Capacity is estimated at 8000 SWU/yr, capable of producing about 26 kg of weapons-grade uranium per year if applied to that end.
Along with this, construction of a 25-30 MWe light water reactor at Yongbyon is reported to have begun in mid 2010, and to require fuel enriched to about 3.5%. Construction was well developed late in 2011.
In its September 2011 report, the IAEA notes that uranium hexafluoride found in a cylinder shipped to Libya by the Khan network in 2001 “very likely” originated in DPRK. The IAEA assesses that this indicates that North Korea had an undeclared uranium conversion capability prior to 2001.
The IAEA Director-General said in March 2014: "It will be five years next month since Agency inspectors were asked to leave the DPRK. Nevertheless, the Agency maintains its readiness to play an essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme. I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in implementing its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and to resolve all outstanding issues."
See also DPRK section of IAEA web site.
Iran attracted world attention in 2002 when previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's declarations to the Agency and raised questions as to whether Iran was in violation of its 1974 safeguards agreement, as a signatory of the NPT, which it joined in 1970.
Iran joined the NPT in 1974 and in 1975-76 construction started on two 1293 MWe nuclear reactors comprising the Bushehr power station on the Persian Gulf. Siemens KWU was the contractor. After the Islamic revolution, payment was withheld and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit 1 substantially complete. About the same time, Iran purchased 450 tonnes of uranium (531 t U3O8) from South Africa. Some 366 t of this was subsequently converted to UF6 at Esfahan.
In 1994 Russia was brought in to complete unit 1 as a VVER-1000 reactor. This necessitated major changes, including fabrication of all the reactor components in Russia under a construction contract with Atomstroyexport. The reactor eventually started up in May 2011 and was grid-connected in September, with commercial operation expected in 2012.
All fuel for the life of the reactor is being supplied from Russia, and it is intended that used fuel will be returned there, obviating the need for any fuel cycle facilities in Iran. All work has been under IAEA safeguards and operation will also be under safeguards. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran has announced that feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe have been ordered.
The 6-7 TWh/yr output from the first reactor will free up about 1.6 million tonnes (11 million barrels) of oil per year for export (or c 1800 million m3 of gas).
In connection with securing a supply of enriched fuel for its nuclear program, in 1974 and 1977 Iran loaned $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission to build the multinational Eurodif enrichment plant at Tricastin, and it secured a 10% equity in the enterprise (entitling it to 10% of output), which the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran still holds. The loan was repaid with interest in 1991 but the plant has never delivered any enriched uranium to Iran. About 1991 Iran demanded delivery of its share of uranium under original contract, but this was refused by France due to political sanctions then being in force. Iran views this refusal as proof of the unreliability of outside nuclear supplies and uses the Eurodif episode to argue its case for achieving energy independence by supplying all of the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle itself. The 10.8 million SWU Eurodif plant operated by Areva started production in 1979 and is due to close soon after 2010.
In 2000 Iran declared its intention to build a uranium conversion plant (UCF) at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre. At the same time it started building at Natanz a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA after it was identified in 2002 by a dissident group. This is known as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), but also at Natanz a large underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) is being developed. Then traces of highly-enriched uranium were found at another facility connected with Natanz, the Kalaye Electric Co in Tehran. These traces were central to questions about Iran's compliance with its safeguards agreement. Questions about Iran’s intentions were further fuelled by discovery in 2009 of the underground Fordow enrichment plant (FFEP).
In 1991 Iran imported 1.8 tonnes of natural uranium from China. Iran did not declare this material however until 2002, and not all of it has been accounted for. Some was converted to metallic form - not required for any part of Iran's declared program. The country has very small uranium reserves, apparently insufficient for any nuclear power program.
Tehran Research Reactor
Iran has a 5 MW pool-type research reactor in Tehran which has operated since about 1967 and is monitored by the IAEA. Since being converted from 93% HEU about 1988 by Argentinian specialists, the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) runs on 19.75% enriched uranium, and 116 kg of this was supplied from Argentina about 1993 - enough for 10-20 years depending on how the reactor is operated. This had nearly run out in 2009. The presence of molybdenum in Iranian UF6 means that domestic supplies may be unsuitable at this level of enrichment.
In 2009 it seemed likely that Russia might provide some further uranium for TRR fuel blended down from 36% enriched material and fabricated in France, in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own (< 5%) enriched uranium from Natanz. This was rejected by Iran, which then tabled a revised version. At issue was the amount of Iran's uranium stockpile to be handed over at one time. The international negotiators wanted to do this exchange in one large shipment, while Iran preferred several smaller swaps which maintained more of its overall holding for a longer period. In February 2010 the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75%.
IR-40 heavy water reactor
Iran is also developing a 40 MW heavy water-moderated "research" reactor at Arak fuelled by natural uranium. It is declared as being to replace the old Teheran reactor. The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Construction is under way and the incomplete plant was "inaugurated" in August 2006. In August 2009 it was about 63% complete, with the reactor vessel due to be installed in 2011.
In July 2011 AEOI reported it as 75% complete. Iran has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards, and it has been subject to IAEA inspection during construction. However, in August 2012 the IAEA noted that “the lack of up-to-date information on the IR-40 Reactor is now having an adverse impact on the Agency’s ability to effectively verify the design of the facility and to implement an effective safeguards approach.” No design information for the IR-40 reactor had been provided since 2006.
A heavy water production plant is operating at Arak, but the IAEA is denied access to it.
All the above facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003. Details are in the Director-General's report to the IAEA Board of 6 June and 9 September 2003, and subsequent reports such as those to May 2007 on IAEA web site.
As an expression of international concern about all these facilities apart from Bushehr, the IAEA gave Iran until the end of October 2003 to resolve outstanding questions about them and its materials. In "a welcome and positive development", Iran then formally told the IAEA that it would accept the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with IAEA, and that it would suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in Iran, specifically those at Natanz. However, implementation of measures in accordance with the Additional Protocol was suspended early in 2006, and enrichment resumed.
An IAEA report released to its member states in November 2003 showed that Iran had, in a series of contraventions of its safeguards agreement over 22 years, systematically concealed its development of key techniques which are capable of use for nuclear weapons. In particular, that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from spent fuel were carried out on a laboratory scale. Iran admitted to the activities but said they were trivial.
In June 2004 The IAEA Board criticised Iran for failing to cooperate adequately with IAEA investigations of its nuclear program. Something of a stand-off then ensued until in August 2005 Iran announced that it would continue its endeavours to enrich uranium, despite international attempts to dissuade it, and the 200 t/yr conversion plant at Isfahan was started. However, the uranium feed from Iran's mines has significant levels of molybdenum and other contaminants which create difficulties for any enrichment, and particularly so for high enrichment. Estimates varied widely regarding what was required to overcome these problems, but from 2005 some means was found to remove enough of the molybdenum from HF6 to enable 3.5% enriched fuel to be produced. However, there continues to be difficulty in producing 19.75% enriched fuel for the country's main Tehran research reactor.
In August 2005 the IAEA Board called upon Iran to suspend work associated with uranium enrichment. In March 2006 the IAEA referred the issue to the UN Security Council. However Iran has not backed off from its uranium enrichment.
In June 2006 the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz was operating a 164-centrifuge cascade commissioned in March which had produced 3.6% enriched material. Two other 164-machine cascades were being installed. Construction of the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) was ongoing. Operations at the PFEP, FEP and the UCF are under international safeguards, though monitoring is constrained.
The IAEA 2003 report said that while no evidence of a weapons program has been found, it would take some time before the IAEA could conclude that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. In April 2006 it said that after three years of investigation and requests for information, the existing gaps in knowledge of Iran's nuclear program continued to a matter of concern. The required "transparency and active cooperation by Iran" to enable the IAEA "to understand fully the twenty years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran" were not forthcoming.
In March 2007 the Russian government told Iran that it would indefinitely withhold fuel for the almost-complete Bushehr nuclear power reactor unless Iran suspended its uranium enrichment program. Some Russian staff working on the project returned home. In the event, some 82 tonnes of fuel was delivered to Iran early in 2008. Fuel loading was expected late in 2009 but was deferred.
On 24 March 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran and reaffirming that Iran must take the steps required by the IAEA Board, notably to suspend its uranium enrichment activities.
The IAEA reported that in mid-May 2007, in addition to the two cascades at PFEP – one of which was in operation, many cascades were in operation at FEP producing enrichment levels of up to 4.8%, more were being tested and under construction at Natanz in defiance of the UN. It also said that Iran had ceased providing information required under the Additional Protocol.
In June 2007 the IAEA Director General said: "Iran has not taken the steps called for by the Board nor responded to the demands of the Security Council. The facts on the ground indicate that Iran continues steadily to perfect its knowledge relevant to enrichment and to expand the capacity of its enrichment facility. Iran has also continued with the construction of its heavy water reactor at Arak. … This is taking place without the Agency being able to make any progress in its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relevant to the nature and scope of Iran´s nuclear programme, or being able to implement the Additional Protocol that would enable the verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities."
In November 2007 Iran announced that the initial target of 3000 centrifuges had been reached – evidently 18 cascades operating. In July 2008 it said that 6000 centrifuges were installed. In May 2011 at the main FEP there were 5860 centrifuges operating in 35 cascades, and another 3000 installed. By August 2012 there were 9156 centrifuges operating in 54 cascades, and another 174 installed. A total of 6876 kg of low-enriched UF6 had been produced at FEP, from about 75 tonnes of UF6 feed.
However, it appears that production fell short of expectations. Part of the reason may be that the P1/ IR1 centrifuges are relatively primitive compared with those operating in Russia, China and the West, and are prone to vibration which means lower speeds and much less effectiveness. Another factor may be that they were manufactured and installed in a hurry due to political pressure and unrealistic deadlines, without relevant competence being developed at a normal pace, and were breaking down at a high rate.
The Fordow site
In September 2009, when it learned that the matter was about to be exposed in the UN General Assembly, Iran told the IAEA that it was building another uranium enrichment plant, but gave no details. It is the Fordow plant, about 20 km north of Qom, in an underground tunnel complex on a military base. It is designed to have 16 cascades of about 3000 centrifuges and is reported to be under the control of AEOI. Evidently construction began in 2006 and it was expected to be operational in 2011. The IAEA first inspected it late in October 2009. In February 2013 it had four IR-1 cascades (two sets tandem) operating, each 174 machines, producing 19.75% enriched uranium at a rate of 10.25 kg/month. Four further cascades had been installed and eight were in place, making a total of 2780 machines.
Clearly Iran has played for time since the discovery in 2002 of its activities contravening its obligations under the NPT, and has developed its enrichment capacity to a high level meanwhile. The existence of the Fordow plant is particularly significant in that it would provide sufficient capacity to take a portion of the Natanz output of LEU up to weapons-grade.
The IAEA continues full involvement with Iran on nuclear safety issues, focused on Bushehr.
Enrichment to 20%, heightened concerns
The IAEA stated clearly in November 2007 that unless the Additional Protocol was ratified and in place it is not possible for the Agency to establish that undeclared nuclear materials and activities are absent. Its "knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing." Meanwhile enrichment continues in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.
The Iran situation has revived wider concerns about which countries should develop facilities with high proliferation significance - such as enrichment and reprocessing, even under safeguards if there is no evident economic rationale. At some point in the future, such a country could give three months notice of withdrawal from the NPT and reconfigure its facilities for weapons production. The USA asserts that Iran has been in fact developing just such a breakout capability.
This contention was supported in February 2010 when the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75%, ostensibly for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), thereby significantly closing the gap between its normal low-enriched material and weapons-grade uranium. On 14 February 2010 about 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium (< 5%) from FEP was taken to PFEP, which would be enough for vastly more 19.8% enriched uranium than the TRR could conceivably use. AEOI has said that the TRR requires 1.5 kg of fresh fuel per month. International concern regarding the surge of activity in enrichment to about 20% U-235 is based on the fact that in terms of SWU (energy) input this is about 90% of the way to weapons-grade material, and thus would require only a small and possibly clandestine plant to bridge the gap.
At PFEP, two cascades have been designated for production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235, apparently for the TRR, and the balance of the plant is designated for R&D. One cascade enriches from 3.5% LEU to almost 20%, while the second one takes the tails from the first one and produces about 10% LEU with tails of less than 1% uranium. The enriched stream is fed into the first cascade. In total, some 1085 kg of the 3.5% LEU from FEP has been fed into one of these cascades, and 150 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium was produced from the start of operations to February 2013.
The IAEA said that the PFEP operations now " required a full revision of the previous safeguards approach", including enhanced surveillance and checks. On 23 June 2011 the head of AEOI was quoted as saying: "We have the ability to produce 5 kg (of 20% enriched uranium) each month, but we do not rush." He had earlier said that the TRR required 1.5 kg of fuel per month. In August 2011 he confirmed that Iran had more 20% LEU than it needed for the Tehran research reactor, and that “security measures required that the sensitive part of the facilities would be transferred to underground buildings” – evidently Fordow. The IAEA reported then that monthly production rates of 20 percent LEU had increased significantly, implying better performance of the two IR-1 cascades.
Over 2009-10 the Iranian centrifuge program was set back by the Stuxnet computer virus which affected Iranian companies involved with the control systems for the IR-1 centrifuges. In late 2009 to early 2010 about 1000 centrifuges at FEP were decommissioned. This appears to have been due to Stuxnet affecting frequency converters and causing the motors to over-speed, destroying the units. The normal failure rate of the IR-1 centrifuges is reported as about 10% per year.
The underground Fordow enrichment plant (FFEP) is evidently playing a larger role in producing 19.75% enriched uranium, using the well-proved IR-1 centrifuges. This positions Iran to stockpile a large amount of 19.75% LEU in a facility better protected against military strikes.
Thus at both PFEP and FFEP Iran had produced 280 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium to February 2013, and this was ongoing at over 15 kg/month.
In June 2010 the AEOI announced that it planned to build four new research reactors for production of medical isotopes, including a 20 MW one to replace TRR when its operational life finishes in 15 years. This plan would justify production of more 20%-enriched uranium at Natanz, which gives rise to international concern.
Further concern was raised when Iran announced that it might build a nuclear-powered submarine, since this would potentially legitimize the country having high-enriched uranium for fuel. It was denounced internationally as simply an excuse for the production of weapons-grade uranium. The potential legitimacy arises from section 14 of the standard Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements signed by non-weapons states. This allows fuel for a “non-proscribed military activity” to evade safeguards.
See also WNA information paper on Iran , Iran section of IAEA web site. ISIS Nuclear Iran website , and Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran
The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program to 1991 was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards.
The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out in 1990, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat. They had accumulated some 550 tonnes of uranium oxide concentrate which was finally removed from Tuwaitha in 2008 and sold to Cameco. At least half of this originated in Niger about 1981.
The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing.
In 1990 Iraq was clearly in violation of its NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid-1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.
In 1981 Iraq's 40 MWt Osirak nuclear reactor was destroyed by an Israeli air strike just before fuel was first loaded into it. It was a French light-water materials test reactor using high-enriched uranium fuel, and Israel alleged that its purpose or at least potential was military.
Iraq joined the NPT in 1969, and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA was concluded in 1972.
Another case of developing nuclear weapons was not under the NPT. Here, the state concerned had a nuclear power program producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors. In addition to a 300,000 SWU/yr uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba which was set up to serve its nuclear power program during a time of trade sanctions, South Africa had a small finishing plant at Pelindaba which took a small proportion of the output and enriched it to weapons-grade.
In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. However, the IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by the country's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. In 1977 it was preparing to test the mechanism of such weapons in the Kalahari Desert, but was dissuaded following joint Russian and US aerial surveillance of the site. The IAEA was asked by South Africa to verify the conclusion of its weapons program.
In 1995 the IAEA was able to declare that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons program had been terminated and dismantled.
Israel is one of three significant countries which have never been part of the NPT. Unlike India and Pakistan, Israel has no civil nuclear power program. However, in 1975 it concluded a limited safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
After Israel was established in 1948, there was close collaboration between France and Israel in nuclear research. Israeli scientists were involved with early French facilities near Marcoule.
In 1952 the Israel Atomic Energy Commission was established, and in 1955 the USA agreed to supply a 5 MWt pool-type reactor for Nahal Soreq, south of Tel Aviv. This IRR-1 required high-enriched uranium supplied from the USA. It started up in 1960 and from the outset was required to be under IAEA safeguards.
In 1957 an agreement was signed with France to build a large (24 MW thermal) heavy water research reactor at Dimona in the Negev desert. This would run on natural uranium and incidentally be suitable for producing weapons-grade plutonium. France apparently supplied four tonnes of heavy water for the reactor and also assisted in the construction of a reprocessing plant at the site.
In 1960 France reportedly urged Israel to put Dimona under full international safeguards, but this was not done. Due to US pressure, cursory twice-yearly inspections were carried out of the reactor only. The reactor started up in 1964, and with the benefit of oversize cooling circuits, power was subsequently raised to 70 MWt. A full suite of infrastructure is reportedly at the Dimona site, including fuel fabrication.
Uranium for the reactor was initially sourced from indigenous deposits, but most is believed to have come from South Africa, over some 20 years of nuclear collaboration from 1967.
In 1968 the US Central Intelligence Agency concluded that Israel had started producing nuclear weapons from separated plutonium. In 1974 it appeared to have 20 nuclear bombs, and by the late 1990s the estimate had grown to 75-130 nuclear warheads. No tests have been undertaken in Israel, but it is widely believed that Israel collaborated with South Africa in a 1979 test off the east coast there.
Israel has never confirmed or denied that it has nuclear weapons.
Using conventional weapons, an Israeli Air Force strike in 1981 destroyed Iraq's Osirak nuclear research reactor near Baghdad.
From about 2001 to 2007 Syria constructed a graphite-moderated gas-cooled nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour, a remote site on the Euphrates River, near Al Kibar. It was very similar to the plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon in North Korea, using natural uranium and graphite moderator. It was about 25 MWt and next to the reactor cavity had vaults for heat exchangers and spent fuel pond, but no turbine generator. The uranium came from indigenous phosphate deposits as by-product of treatment at Homs (Syria produces over 3.5 Mt/yr of rock phosphate which could yield 100-200 tU/yr).
Before fuel was loaded it was damaged beyond repair by an Israeli air strike in September 2007 and the remains were demolished and buried soon after. The entire enterprise, apparently aimed at production of weapons plutonium, was clandestine and in breach of Syria's obligations under the NPT. The evidence also pointed to North Korean involvement in supplying nuclear equipment. Syria claims that the building was a military non-nuclear installation, but has declined to discuss the matter with the IAEA in the light of evidence to the contrary, or to account credibly for the presence of anthropogenic (industrially-treated) uranium found at the site by IAEA in June 2008. It has refused to allow further IAEA access to this site or to a facility near Marj as Sulţān located in the eastern suburbs of Damascus, which was apparently connected with fuel preparation.
In its November 2010 report, the IAEA said that Syria's cooperation with the Agency had diminished, access was still denied to several sites in question, and there were several serious questions and issues outstanding. The IAEA called on Syria to sign and fully implement an Additional Protocol - supposedly in force from 2006 - as well as urgently remedying its non-compliance with its existing NPT safeguards agreement, concluded in 1980. In June 2011 the IAEA board resolved to report Syria to the UN Security Council and General Assembly over non-compliance with its safeguard obligations and failing to declare the construction of a nuclear reactor.
After several months of negotiations, Libya agreed in December 2003 to halt its development of nuclear weapons. For more than a decade it had been engaged in the development of a uranium enrichment capability, based on importing natural uranium together with centrifuge and conversion equipment, and the construction of now-dismantled pilot-scale centrifuge facilities. Some of these activities should have been reported to the IAEA under Libya's 1980 Safeguards Agreement with the UN body, but were not.
Evidently Libya's nuclear enrichment program was at an early stage and no industrial-scale facility had been built, nor any enriched uranium produced. Pakistan, which is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was the source of the illicit technology from the late 1990s.
In its September 2011 report on North Korea, the IAEA notes that uranium hexafluoride found in a cylinder shipped to Libya by the Khan network in 2001 “very likely” originated in DPRK.
Libya has a Russian 10 MW research reactor using 80% enriched fuel, which has been under IAEA safeguards. It has no nuclear power program. It asked the IAEA to verify publicly that all of its nuclear activities will henceforth be under safeguards and exclusively for peaceful purposes. In that regard, Libya agreed to take the necessary steps to conclude an Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and this came into force in 2006. This will provide the IAEA with broader inspection rights, and will require full transparency and active co-operation. The first IAEA inspections of previously-undeclared facilities were at the end of December 2003.
There have been persistent reports from defectors, opposition and dissident groups regarding certain technical developments in Burma which may indicate a program to develop a nuclear weapon. These are unconfirmed, and Burma formerly refused to cooperate with IAEA in any investigation, despite its safeguards agreement with IAEA having been concluded in 1995. However, in June 2011 the vice-president said that Myanmar “has halted [its nuclear research] programme as [the] international community may misunderstand Myanmar over the issue.” He said, “Myanmar made arrangements for nuclear research with the assistance of Russia in order that Myanmar will not lag behind other countries in that field and to improve its education and health sectors…,” but “Myanmar is [in] no position to take account of nuclear weapons and does not have enough economic strength to do so.” This statement was followed by the announcement that Myanmar has halted its nuclear research due to the high potential for international confusion. Then in November 2012 it announced that it would sign the Additional Protocol, and did so in September 2013. In mid-2013 the president reiterated the 2011 commitment. Concern had centred on North Korean involvement.
Australian Safeguards & Non-proliferation Office, Euratom.
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 2003, North Korea's nuclear program 2003.
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Sep-Oct 2002.
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Feb 2010, Iran's Gas Centrifuge program: Taking Stock
ISIS: Technical note on Burma, April 2011 and subsequent posts.