(January 2009)
As several East European countries queued up to join the European Union they came under pressure to forsake much of their electric power capacity, where this relied upon early Soviet technology. Of course the main criteria for EU membership are economic, but nuclear safety is also on the list. Some of these countries had Soviet-designed nuclear plants, The Russian government has extended the operating lifetimes of its four oldest VVER reactors (the V-230s), its four oldest RBMKs (at Kursk & Leningrad) and the four GBWRs in Siberia.
Safety concerns of early Soviet plants
Despite extensive modifications in the last 20 years, the safety features of these two designs do not conform to Western standards. This does not in itself mean that they are unsafe, simply that their safety features differ from those mandated by western licensing requirements. Hence in EU accession countries, the EU requires that they be shut down at some agreed date before the end of their design life. There is also pressure on Armenia to close its plant. Part of the background to all this relates to the Chernobyl disaster and decisions taken following the reunification of Germany.
VVER-440: V-230 type Reactors
1980, 82
Early RBMK type Reactors
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, Western governments were quick to point the finger at RBMK and first-generation VVER reactors in Eastern Europe in order to emphasise the high levels of safety built into western designs. In the emotive discussion of the late 1980s, western safety standards were taken as the unquestioned yardsticks, while in fact the more profound differences were in safety culture. In the event, no western reactor was stopped and no western construction project aborted by political decision as a result of Chernobyl, and opinion polls supported continued operation of western plants.
After reunification, the new German government in 1989 examined the feasibility of upgrading the six second- and third-generation VVER reactors under construction in East Germany (one had just started up). While it was found that they could in fact be bought up to western safety standards at acceptable cost, they were abandoned because no investor could be found to take on the re-licensing risk in the context of Germany's nuclear bureaucracy and legal processes.
The collapse of socialism in the Comecon countries in 1989 and 1990 paved the way for openness and cooperation between countries that had for decades belonged to antagonistic blocs. The new democracies looked to the West for help in reforming their economies and their administrative structures. The EU set up its assistance programs and individual countries started bilateral programs. Following a German initiative, the G7 summit in Munich in June 1992 agreed on a multilateral Action Program for improving the safety of all Soviet-designed reactors in Central and Eastern Europe.
The Multilateral Action Program
Two outcomes of this meeting were that assistance or short-term improvements for the two types of reactor would be conditional upon commitments to shut them down "as soon as possible", and that assistance for upgrades of newer plants would require safety studies and analyses of energy policies, energy alternatives and financing. The World Bank and EBRD, its European counterpart, were put in charge of this.
In effect, the G7 governments thus made efficient cooperation impossible because the Action Program interfered with the energy policies of sovereign states and also established complex administrative procedures to bog down any initiative. Above all, it failed to strike a balance between the interests of the G7 countries with those of the reform states.
As a result, ten years after the Munich G7 summit, both sides had reason to be disappointed: none of the reactors considered least safe had been closed, and none of the newer plants had been upgraded in the framework of EU or EBRD credits. But the only upgrading projects that have been or are being implemented to about 2000, i.e. Mochovce 1 & 2 (Slovakia), Paks (Hungary) and Temelin (Czech Rep), were financed privately.
In implementing the Action Program, EU and EBRD consistently promoted early closure of the two condemned reactor types. In exchange for assistance in safety reviews at Kozloduy 1 & 2, they originally made Bulgaria promise to close all four of its older units by 1998. In return for German export credits for safety upgrades of a newer plant, Mochovce 1 & 2, Slovakia had to promise to close down two older ones (Bohunice 1 & 2) after Mochovce became fully commercial. It was also said that this had to be in the year 2000 at the latest. In 1995 Ukraine agreed to close the remaining units at Chernobyl by 2000 in exchange for assistance in modernising the Chernobyl-4 shelter and in improving the energy sector of the country, including the completion of two new nuclear reactors, Khmelnitski 2 and Rovno 4.
Later on, these countries recognised they were paying too high a price and that in fact the West failed to assist them speedily and efficiently in solving their problems. Therefore, closures were delayed and one Slovakian and one Lithuanian unit are still operating, though the 2000 deadline for closing Chernobyl in Ukraine was met.
EU accession: Bulgaria, Lithuania & Slovakia
In May 2004 five Eastern European countries with nuclear power plants joined the EU. These are Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Lithuania. All but Slovenia operate Soviet-designed reactors, but only those discussed in this paper are a source of contention.
A new round of political manoeuvring was started with the invitation of reform states to join the EU. One of the conditions laid down by the EU in 1997 was that all nuclear plants concerned had to achieve Western safety standards within 7 to 10 years.
Shut-down dates for older units returned to the agenda. Encouraged by the offer of EUR 200 million from the EC, Bulgaria's Kozloduy 1 & 2 were closed on 31 December 2002 and Kozloduy 3 & 4 followed at the end of 2006, the latter under protest, since these are the most modern of all the reactors concerned and are close to the specifications of the V-213 model. Slovakia agreed to close its older units (Bohunice 1 & 2) by the end of 2006 and 2008 respectively, despite recently completing a major refurbishing of them, including replacement of the emergency core cooling systems and modernising the control systems. Lithuania agreed to close its first RBMK unit, Ignalina-1, by 2005 and the second in 2009.
As yet, it is not clear what the requirement of "Western safety standards" will mean for the other nuclear plants operating in reform states. Some plants have undergone or are undergoing major modernisation programs bringing them to Western safety level.
WENRA, the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association, was put in charge of analysing the safety level of all plants in EU accession candidates. It published two Reports, in March 1999 and November 2000. Broadly, the 2000 report found that the nuclear regulatory regimes in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were comparable with Western European practice, while those in Bulgaria and Lithuania needed more independence to achieve levels of practice comparable to those in the West. Bulgaria reformed its regulatory structure in 2003 and Lithuania adopted a new statue for its authority in mid 2002.
More recently nuclear industry representatives from eastern Europe have called for the introduction of transparent and rational EU safety standards rather than punitive closures of reactors which have been substantially upgraded. In particular the Slovak Bohunice 1 & 2 units were cited as prime examples of the high safety standards which such reactors could achieve through upgrading with input from western firms such as Siemens.
Similar arguments were put forward in relation to Units 3 and 4 at Kozloduy in Bulgaria. In 2002 the Bulgarian parliament decided almost unanimously that these units would not be closed down until after Bulgaria had gained EU membership, despite the EU's insistence that they close in 2006, prior to the country's admission. Following a decade of safety upgrades on the units, an IAEA mission reported very favourably in July 2002. In 2003, after a 2-week scrutiny by 18 international inspectors, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) reported that the units met all necessary international standards for safe operation. This confirmed the earlier IAEA report. WANO said that after more than a decade of safety upgrades on units 3 & 4 in line with IAEA recommendations: "operational, seismic and design safety at Kozloduy now corresponds to the level of improvements seen at plants of similar vintage elsewhere. Many of the safety measures adopted for these plants in the design, operation and seismic areas exceeded those that were foreseen."
In the event the two reactors were closed at the end of 2006. However, the Bulgarian government continues its attempts to have the decision reviewed by the EU, so far unsuccessfully. In January 2007 WANO declared that "no technical reasons exist for the early closure of units 3 & 4." The licences expire in 2011 & 2013, which would give a 30-year operating life. Electricity shortages in the Balkan area have been acute since early in 2007 and have occasionally been exacerbated by Russian gas politics.
A 2002 Gallup Poll revealed that a large majority of Bulgarians believed that the EU was being unreasonable in insisting on the closure of the four Soviet-designed reactors - over 77% of them disagreed that they should be closed prematurely on safety grounds. Over 66% thought that the government should firmly resist demands to close the first two units at the end of 2002, even if this delayed Bulgaria's accession to the EU. Almost 70% thought that the EU had a hidden economic or political agenda in demanding the closures, and nearly 90% thought that electricity prices would rise as a result.
Ukraine
While not in line for EU membership, the EU has taken a keen interest in Ukraine's nuclear plants, notably Chernobyl. Finance for the Khmelnitski-2 and Rovno-4 reactors which were meant to replace Chernobyl proved difficult. In 2002 the Ukrainian president signed legislation approving a Russian loan of US$ 44 million for their completion. The arrangement, covered goods and services from Russia, and was approved by Ukraine's parliament in November 2002. It followed signing of a US$ 144 million agreement in June, including about US$ 100 million of fuel. Talks continued with the European Bank of Reconstruction & Development (EBRD) on further funds for the project, though a loan of US$ 215 million was deferred late in 2001.
The Ukrainian government then approved estimates for the completion, site works and upgrades for the two nuclear power reactors, at US$ 621 million and US$ 642 million respectively. First cores for both VVER-1000 units added some US$ 100 million. (Both reactors were 80% complete when a four-year halt was imposed in 1990.)
With local finance, the government moved to complete both units using a consortium of Framatome ANP and Atomstroyexport. However, it resumed negotiating with EBRD for west European finance - the US$ 215 million loan which was almost agreed in 2001 with US$ 585 million from the EU, but the government then baulked at doubling the wholesale price of power to USD 2.5 cent/kWh. It then proceeded with construction using a Russian credit facility and local bonds. Both units commenced operation in 2004.
Armenia
Armenia is also not a candidate for EU membership, but its old Metsamor plant (VVER V-270, first power in 1979) is also a concern to the EU and to neighbouring Turkey. There have been various calls to shut it down, but Armenia is very dependent on it. Its slightly older twin was shut down in 1989 after 13 years operation.
Shut-down dates for condemned plants in EU accession countries
The RBMK reactor, a graphite-moderated type with the fuel and cooling water in pressure tubes, has been much discussed and is based on a design developed for military plutonium production. While tolerably stable and safe at operating power, RBMKs at less than 20% power were notoriously unstable, which is how the 1986 Chernobyl disaster came about. After this, all RBMKs underwent major modification to their control systems, and the fuel enrichment was increased from 1.8% to 2.4% U-235 (most reactors use fuel enriched to 3.5% or more U-235). Lithuania's Ignalina reactors were once the world's largest.
The first-generation VVER (V230 model) is a 440 MWe (gross) pressurised water design similar to the most popular western design (which is derived from power plants for submarines). The V230 has no containment structure in the western sense but has provisions for confinement of any radioactivity arising from a major accident. In addition its sturdy design, low power density and large volume of water mean that it has a considerable degree of inherent safety in these respects. Emergency core cooling systems have been significantly upgraded in the last decade.
The political context
As well as those reactors in contention because of their countries' EU accession plans, there are a number of others of the same two types operating in other east European countries. These include eleven RBMK reactors in Russia, as well as four early VVERs in Russia and one in Armenia. All of these have received substantial attention in upgrading over the last 15 years (the Armenian one being redesignated as V-270). Later VVER reactors have also had significant upgrading, but their safety status is less contentious.
The clash of political imperatives and the mundane task of supplying electricity demand is a vexed question almost everywhere in Europe today. Environmental concerns dictate that greenhouse questions must be taken seriously and carbon emissions limited, but a vocal minority also clamours for scaling back nuclear energy production. The particular dilemma in Eastern Europe relates to the definition of safety in nuclear power production, and whether Western standards are the only sensible benchmark.
Sources:Substantially from paper by W. Breyer, Siemens AG, PIME 2/00,Siemens Power Journal Dec 99,PPNN Newsbrief # 4/99Perera, Judith 2003, Nuclear Power in the Former USSR, McCloskey, UK.
Appendix:
Soviet-designed Reactors
The Soviet-designed RBMK-type reactor unit of 925 MWe such as at Chernobyl uses a large mass of graphite (some 1200 tonnes of it) to moderate the reaction and water flowing through channels holding the fuel elements to cool it. There is no containment structure on this kind of reactor.
There are currently 61 Soviet-designed nuclear plants in operation in the former Eastern Bloc countries, with others under construction. They include:
Significant assistance has been initiated by the OECD, IAEA and European Commission to bring these reactors up to western safety standards, or at least to effect significant improvements. This involves plant modifications, identification and remedying of safety deficiencies, training of staff and audits of the status of plant components.
The national, bilateral and international safety initiatives being undertaken are concentrating on the first generation of Soviet-built VVER-440/230 pressurised water reactors and the RBMK reactors, which have the most serious deficiencies.
Modifications have already been made to overcome deficiencies in all the RBMK reactors still operating. In these, originally the nuclear chain reaction and power output would increase if cooling water were lost or turned to steam, in contrast to most Western designs. It was this effect which caused the uncontrolled power surge that led to the destruction of Chernobyl-4.
All of the RBMK reactors have now been modified by changes in the control rods, adding neutron absorbers and consequently increasing the fuel enrichment from 1.8 to 2.4% U-235, making them very much more stable at low power. Automatic shut-down mechanisms now operate faster, and other safety mechanisms have been improved. Automated inspection equipment has also been installed. A repetition of the 1986 Chernobyl accident is now virtually impossible, according to a German nuclear safety agency report.
The arrangements for closing down the VVER-440/230 and RBMK reactors in Slovakia and Lithuania leaves the Armenian and four Russian VVER-440/230 reactors and the Russian RBMK reactors as the outstanding safety concerns. Two of the closed V-230 reactors in Bulgaria had been upgraded substantially and it was claimed that they now had safety comparable with western units.The Russian government has extended the operating lifetimes of its four oldest VVER reactors (the V-230s), its four oldest RBMKs (at Kursk & Leningrad) and the four GBWRs in Siberia.