Nuclear Power in Russia
(December 2008)
- Russia is moving steadily forward with plans for much expanded role of nuclear energy, at least doubling output by 2020.
- Efficiency of nuclear generation has increased dramatically over the last decade.
- Electrcity demand is rising strongly.
- Exports are a major policy and economic objective.
Contents
Russia's first nuclear power plant, and the first in the world to produce electricity, was the 5 MWe Obninsk reactor, in 1954. Russia's first two commercial-scale nuclear power plants started up in 1963-64, then in 1971-73 the first of today's production models were commissioned. By the mid 1980s Russia had 25 power reactors in operation, but the nuclear industry was beset by problems. The Chernobyl accident led to a resolution of these, as outlined in the Appendix.
Between the 1986 Chernobyl accident and mid 1990s, only one nuclear power station was commissioned in Russia, the 4-unit Balakovo, with unit 3 being added to Smolensk. Economic reforms following the collapse of the Soviet Union meant an acute shortage of funds for nuclear developments, and a number of projects were stalled. But by the late 1990s exports of reactors to Iran, China and India were negotiated and Russia's stalled domestic construction program was revived as far as funds allowed.
Around 2000 nuclear construction revived and Rostov-1 (now known as Volgodonsk-1), the first of the delayed units, started up in 2001, joining 21 GWe already on the grid. This greatly boosted morale in the Russian nuclear industry. It was followed by Kalinin-3 in 2004.
By 2006 the government's resolve to develop nuclear power had firmed and there were projections of adding 2-3 GWe per year to 2030 in Russia as well as exporting plants to meet world demand for some 300 GWe of new nuclear capacity in that time frame.
Electricity supply
Russia's electricity supply, formerly centrally controlled by RAO Unified Energy System (UES) , faces a number of acute constraints. First, demand is rising strongly after more than a decade of stagnation, secondly some 50 GWe of generating plant (more than a quarter of it) in the European part of Russia comes to the end of its design life by 2010, and thirdly Gazprom has cut back on the very high level of natural gas supplies for electricity generation because it can make about five times as much money by exporting the gas to the west (27% of EU gas comes from Russia). UES' gas-fired plants burned about 60% of the gas marketed in Russia by Gazprom, and it is aimed to halve this by 2020. (Also, by 2020, the Western Siberian gas fields will be so depleted that they supply only a tenth of current Russian output, compared with nearly three quarters now.) Also there are major regional grid constraints so that a significant proportion of the capacity of some plants cannot be used.
Electricity production reached 1016 billion kWh in 2007, with 160 billion kWh (16%) coming from nuclear power, 67% from gas and coal and 18% from hydro. In 2005 net export was 12 TWh and final consumption was 650 TWh (after distribution losses of 113 and energy sector use of 178 TWh). Nuclear capacity is about 10% of total 211 GWe. Electricity demand is projected to grow to 1426 billion kWh in 2015 (or maybe 1600 billion kWh in high scenario) and to 1700 to 2000 billion kWh by 2020, requiring 340 to 390 GWe total by then, requiring US$ 420 to $540 billion investment. Early in 2008 projected annual electricity demand growth to 2020 was put at 4%.
Nuclear electricity output is rising strongly due simply to better performance of the nuclear plants, with capacity factors leaping from 56% to 76% 1998-2003. In gross terms, output is projected to grow from about 150 billion kWh in 2005 to 166 in 2010, and 239 billion kWh in 2016 (18.6% of total). or more soberly to 230 billion kWh in 2020. Nuclear generating capacity is planned to grow more than 50% from 23 GWe gross (21.7 net) in 2006 to 35 GWe in 2016, and at least double to 51 GWe by 2020.
In 2006 Rosatom announced a target of nuclear providing 23% of electricity by 2020 and 25% by 2030, but 2007 plans approved by the government have scaled this back a little (see: Extending Nuclear Capacity below).
In parallel with this Russia is greatly increasing its hydro-electric capacity, aiming to increase by 60% to 2020 and double it by 2030. Hydro OGK is planning to commission 5 GWe by 2011. The 3 GWe Boguchanskaya plant in Siberia is being developed in collaboration with Rusal, for aluminium smelting. The aim is to have almost half of Russia's electricity from nuclear and hydro by 2030.
Following proposals worked out over several years, a government order consolidating the country's nuclear utilities was signed in 2001. Rosenergoatom, which in 2008 became Energoatom, took over all civil reactors including those under construction, and related infrastructure.
Energoatom operates within the context of 2003 state energy policy, and of state funding for new plants to meet policy goals. A policy priority is to reduce the use of natural gas for electricity and to double the nuclear output by 2020. The growth is to come from lifetime extension of first-generation units, upgrading, increased availability to 85% average (and hopefully more), together with new plants.
UES electricity tariffs were planned to increase from (US$) 1.1 c/kWh in 2001 to 1.9 c/kWh in 2005 and 2.4 c/kWh in 2015. However, only much smaller increases have so far been approved by the government, and even these have attracted wide opposition. However, electricity supplied is now being fully paid for, in contrast to the situation in the mid 1990s.
In February 2007 UES said that it was aiming to raise up to US$ 15 billion by selling shares in as many as 15 power generation companies, having increased its investment target by 2010 from $79 to $118 billion. Late in 2006 UES raised $459 million by selling 14.4% of one of its generators, OGK-5, and since then the UES sell-off has continued with investors committing to continued expansion. In mid 2008 RAO UES was wound up, having sold off all its assets. Some of these were bought by EU utilities, for instance Finland's Fortum bought at auction 76.5% of the small utility TGC-10, which operates in well-developed industrial regions of the Urals and Western Siberia. From July 2008, 25% of all Russia's power is sold on the competitive market. The wholesale power market is expected to be fully liberalised by 2011.
Present nuclear capacity
Russia's nuclear plants, with 31 operating reactors totalling 21,743 MWe, comprise:
- 4 first generation VVER-440/230 or similar pressurised water reactors,
- 2 second generation VVER-440/213 pressurised water reactors,
- 9 third generation VVER-1000 pressurised water reactors with a full containment structure,
- 11 RBMK light water graphite reactors now unique to Russia (apart from a larger unit in Lithuania). The four oldest of these were commissioned in the 1970s at Kursk and Leningrad and are of some concern to the Western world. A further Kursk unit is under construction.
- 4 small graphite-moderated BWR reactors in eastern Siberia, constructed in the 1970s for cogeneration (EGP-6 models on linked map).
- One BN-600 fast-breeder reactor.
Apart from Bilibino, several reactors supply district heating - a total of over 8 PJ/yr.
Generally, reactors are licensed for 30 years from first power. Late in 2000, plans were announced for lifetime extensions of twelve first-generation reactors* totalling 5.7 GWe, and the extension period envisaged is now 15 years, necessitating major investment in refurbishing them by 2006. So far three 15-year extensions have been achieved for Novovoronezh-3 & 4, Kursk-1 & 2, Kola-1 & 2 and Leningrad-1 & 2. Bilibino 1 & 2 have been given 5-year licence extensions. Replacement of all these twelve units after 2015-20 is planned.
* Leningrad 1&2, Kursk 1&2, Kola 1&2, Bilibino 1-4, Novovoronezh 3&4.
In 2006, Rosatom said it was considering lifetime extensions and uprating of its eleven operating RBMK reactors. Following significant design modifications made after the Chernobyl accident, as well as extensive refurbishment including replacement of fuel channels, a 45-year lifetime is seen as realistic for the 1000 MWe units. In 2005 they provided 48% of Russia's nuclear-generated electricity. Upgrading of Leningrad 3 is under way with a view to 20-year life extension, to 2029, and unit 4 will follow suit. Kursk 3 & 4 and Smolensk 1-3 will probably be next. The R&D Institute of Power Engineering was preparing plans for 5% uprating of the later Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk units.
Power Reactors in Operation
| Reactor |
Type
V=PWR |
MWe net,
each |
Commercial
operation |
Scheduled
close |
| Balakovo 1-2 |
V-320 |
950 |
5/86, 1/88 |
2015, 2017 |
| Balakovo 3-4 |
V-320 |
950 |
4/89, 12/93 |
2018, 2023 |
| Beloyarsk 3 |
BN600 FBR |
560 |
11/81 |
2010 |
| Bilibino 1-4 |
LWGR EGP-6 |
11 |
4/74-1/77 |
2009, 09, 11, 12 |
| Kalinin 1-2 |
V-338 |
950 |
6/85, 3/87 |
2014, 2016 |
| Kalinin 3 |
V-320 |
950 |
12/04 |
2034 |
| Kola 1-2 |
V-230 |
411 |
12/73, 2/75 |
2018, 2019 |
| Kola 3-4 |
V-213 |
411 |
12/82, 12/84 |
2011, 2014 |
| Kursk 1-2 |
RBMK |
925 |
10/77, 8/79 |
2021, 2024 |
| Kursk 3-4 |
RBMK |
925 |
3/84, 2/86 |
2013, 2015 |
| Leningrad 1-2 |
RBMK |
925 |
11/74, 2/76 |
2019, 2022 |
| Leningrad 3-4 |
RBMK |
925 |
6/80, 8/81 |
2009, 2011,
+20 yr |
| Novovoronezh 3-4 |
V-179 |
385 |
6/72, 3/73 |
2016, 2017 |
| Novovoronezh 5 |
V-187 |
950 |
2/81 |
2010 |
| Smolensk 1-3 |
RBMK |
925 |
9/83, 7/85,1/90 |
2013, 2020 |
| Volgodonsk 1 |
V-320 |
950 |
3/01 |
2030 |
| Total: 31 |
21,743 MWe |
Several more reactors have been under construction. A mid-2006 announcement pledged US$ 665 million in 2007 towards completing Rostov / Volgodonsk-2, Kalinin-4 and Beloyarsk-4. Balakovo 5 & 6 disappeared from the list and their completion has been deferred due to UES puting them as low priority (but see mention of Rusal proposal below).
There has been some uncertainty about completing Kursk-5 - an upgraded RBMK design. However, Rosatom is keen to see it completed and in January 2007 the Duma's energy committee recommended that the government fund its completion by 2010. It is more than 70% complete and requires US$ 755 million to finish, plus a similar amount for grid improvement. In March 2007 the Industry Ministry recommended to the government that work proceed and Rosenergoatom then applied for 27 billion roubles (US$ 1 billion) from the ministry's 2008-10 federal budget to complete it. This appears unlikely to materialise so its completion is contingent upon finding other funds, and discussions with "a private investor" continue. All other RBMK reactors - long condemned by the EU - are due to close by 2024, leaving it technologically isolated.
Extending nuclear capacity Rosatom's initial proposal for a rapid expansion of nuclear capacity was based on the cost effectiveness of completing the 9 GWe of then partially built plant. To get the funds, Minatom offered Gazprom the opportunity to invest in some of the partly completed nuclear plants. The argument was that the US$ 7.3 billion required for the whole 10 GWe (including the just-completed Rostov-1) would be quickly recouped from gas exports if the new nuclear plant reduced the need to burn that gas domestically.
In September 2006 Rosatom announced a target of nuclear providing 23% of electricity by 2020, thus commissioning two 1200 MWe plants per year from 2011 to 2014 and then three per year until 2020 - some 31 GWe and giving some 44,000 MWe of nuclear capacity then.
In October 2006 Russia formally adopted a US$ 55 billion nuclear energy development program, with $26 billion of this to 2015 coming from the federal budget. The balance will be from industry (Rosatom) funds and no private investment is involved. The Minister of Finance strongly supported the program to increase nuclear share from 15.6% to 18.6% of total, hence improving energy security as well as promoting exports of nuclear power technology. After 2015 all funding will be from Rosatom revenues.
Reactors under construction include Rostov/ Volgodonsk-2, a V-320 unit due for completion in 2009, and Kalinin-4, a V-320 unit which is being built by Nizhny-Novgorod Atomenergopoekt which is due for completion in 2011.
Apart from completing units under construction there will be four standard third-generation VVER reactors built: at Leningrad (two units to commence stage 2) and Novovoronezh (similarly) to be commissioned 2012-14. This leads to a program of starting to build at least 2000 MWe per year in Russia from 2009 (apart from export plants).
In April 2007 the government approved in principle a construction program to 2020 for electricity-generating plants. It is designed to maximise the share of electricity from nuclear, coal, and hydro while reducing that from gas. This envisages starting up one unit per year from 2009, two from 2012, three from 2015 and four from 2016. Present nuclear capacity is to increase at least 2.3 times by 2020.
In September 2007 the first version of the following scheme was released, but noting that from 2012 to 2020 only two 1200 MWe units per year were within the "financial capacity of the federal task program". Accordingly, the third units for 2015 and 2016 were designated "proposed". In the February 2008
update of this, one 1200 MWe Tversk unit was brought forward to 2015 scheduled start-up, so is now designated "planned".
In February 2008 the earlier federal target plan (FTP) to 2020 was endorsed with little change except than an extra five VVER-1200 units were added as "maximum scenario" or "extra" in the last few years to 2020. As well as the 4800 MWe capacity now under construction, a further 12,000 MWe is planned for completion mostly by 2016, and then another 16,000 to 22,000 MWe proposed by 2020. Several new sites are involved. Some US$ 282 billion is to be invested by 2015, and a further $204 billion to 2020 on the projects listed. Also the new 300 MWe units were listed as being VBER-300 PWR types.
More significantly, the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MIE) and Rosatom were charged with promptly developing an action plan to attract investment into power generation. It is envisaged that by 2020 much generation will be privatized and competitive, while the state will control natural monopoly functions such as the grid.
However, from January 2009 the FTP will be replaced by Rosatom's long-term activity program. This includes Kaliningrad and Kursk, both subject to private finance. However, capacity targets and expenditure are much as above. By 2030 nuclear share of electricity is expected to grow to 25%, from present 16%.
Major Power Reactors under Construction and Planned
| Plant |
Type |
MWe |
Status, Start Construction |
Commercial operation |
| Rostov /Volgodonsk 2 |
V-320 |
1000 |
Const |
2009 |
| Kursk 5 |
RBMK |
1000 |
Const |
2010?? |
| Severodvinsk |
KLT-40S
|
40 x 2
|
Const 4/07
|
2010
|
| Kalinin 4 |
V-320 |
1000 |
Const |
2011 |
| Beloyarsk 4 |
BN-800 FBR |
800 |
Const |
2012 |
| Novovoronezh II -1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Const 6/08 |
2012 |
| Leningrad II-1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200
|
1200 |
Const 10/08
|
10/2013
|
| Subtotal of 8 |
6280 gross, 59800 net |
| Novovoronezh II -2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned 2009 |
2013 |
| Rostov /Volgodonsk 3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned 2009 |
2013 |
| Leningrad II -2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned 2010 |
10/2014 |
| Seversk 1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned 2010 |
2015 |
| Tver 1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200
|
Planned
|
2015
|
| Baltic 1 (Kaliningrad) |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned 2010
|
2015
|
| Leningrad II -3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned |
2015 |
| Rostov /Volgodonsk 4 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned |
2014 |
| Nizhegorod 1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned |
2016 |
| Leningrad II -4 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Planned |
2018 |
| Baltic 2 (Kaliningrad) |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200
|
1200
|
Planned
|
2016
|
| subtotal of 11 |
|
13,200 gross, 12,870 net |
| South Ural 1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2016 |
| Novovoronezh II -3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200
|
Proposed |
2017 ?
|
| Tver 2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2017 |
| Seversk 2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2017 |
| Tsentral 1 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2017 |
| Kola II - 1 |
VK-300 or VBER 300 |
300 |
Proposed |
2017 |
| Nizhegorod 2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2018 |
| South Ural 2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2018 |
| Kola II - 2 |
VK-300 or VBER 300 |
300 |
Proposed |
2018 |
| Novovoronezh II -4 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200
|
Proposed
|
2019 ?
|
| Tver 3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2019 |
| South Ural 3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2019 |
| Tsentral 2 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2019 |
| Kola II - 3 |
VK-300 or VBER 300 |
300 |
Proposed |
2019 |
| Primorsk 1 |
VK-300 or VBER 300 |
300 |
Proposed |
2019 |
| Nizhegorod 3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2020 |
| Nizhegorod 4 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200
|
Proposed |
2020 ?
|
| Tsentral 3 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200
|
Proposed |
2019 ?
|
Tsentral 4
|
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200
|
Proposed |
2020 ?
|
| South Ural 4 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2020 |
| Tver 4 |
AES-2006 / VVER 1200 |
1200 |
Proposed |
2020 |
| Kola II - 4 |
VK-300 or VBER 300 |
300 |
Proposed |
2020 |
| Primorsk 2 |
VK-300 or VBER 300 |
300 |
Proposed |
2020 |
| Pevek |
KLT-40S
|
40 x 2
|
Proposed |
2020
|
subtotal of 25 units
|
22,280
|
|
South Urals was to be BN-800, and may revert.
Seversk is near Tomsk, Tver is near Kalinin, Nizhegorod is a new site near Nizhniy Novgorod, 400 km east of Moscow, and Tsentral (central) in Yaroslavl or Kostrama regions. South Ural is 140 km west of Chelyabinsk. Primorsk is in the far east and Pevek (floating nuclear cogeneration plant) in the Chukotka Autonomous Region.
Note: On the basis of the above figures we have listed those units to Volgodonsk 4 (Rostov), Leningrad 4, Nizhegorod 1 and Baltic 2 at Kaliningrad as "planned" (12 x 1200), and the balance of 25 units total 22,280 MWe to 2020 as "proposed".
Novovoronezh phase II is being built by Moscow AtomEnergoProekt, with work starting in 2007. This is the lead plant for deploying the AES-2006 units. First concrete was poured for unit 1 of this (unit 6 at the site) in June 2008 and it is expected to be commissioned in 2012, with unit 2 following in 2013, at a total cost of US$ 5 billion for 2136 MWe net. Rostechnadzor licensed construction of unit 2 in October 2008. It is on one of the main hubs of the Russian grid.
A general contract for Leningrad II was signed with St Petersburg AtomEnergoProekt (SPb AEP) in August 2007 and Rostechnadzor granted site licences in September 2007. A specific engineering, procurement and construction contract for the first two units was signed in March 2008, and first concrete was poured on schedule for unit 1 in October 2008. This 1170 MWe unit should be commissioned in October 2013 and the second a year later at a cost of US$ 5.8 billion ($2480/kW) possibly including some infrastructure. Total project cost is estimated at $6.6 billion. They are designed to replace the oldest two Leningrad units. A design contract for the next two units was signed with SPb AEP in September 2008.
Turbine generators for the new plants are mainly from Power Machines, which has six orders for high-speed turbines: four of 1200 MWe for Novovoronezh and Leningrad, plus smaller ones for Kalinin and Beloyarsk. The company plans also to offer 1200 MWe low-speed turbines from 2014 to compete with Alstom Atomenergomash.
The Seversk plant near Tomsk is due to start up in 2015 after a construction start in 2010, with the second AES-2006 unit in 2017. Seversk is the site of a major enrichment plant and former weapons facilities. A design contract for the Arabelle low-speed turbine generators has been signed between Moscow AEP which is responsible for design and engineering, and Alstom Atomenergomash, the joint venture between French turbine manufacturer Alstom and Atomenergomash, an AEP subsidiary.
Apart from the February 2008 plan, Rosatom subsidiary InterRAO EES proposed a Baltic nuclear plant in Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast to generate electricity for export, and with up to 49% European equity. Private equity would be an innovation for Russia. The plant would comprise two 1200 MWe VVER units designed by St Petersburg Atomenergoproekt, sited at Neman, close to the Lithuanian border and costing some RUR 134 billion (EUR 6 billion). There appears to be a political agenda involved and it would directly compete with the Baltic states plus Poland plan for a new unit at Visaginas near Ignalina in Lithuania, and it is designed to be integrated with the EU grid. Exports to Germany via Poland, requiring some EUR 1 billion in transmission infrastructure, are proposed. There is already substantial transmission capacity east through Lithuania to the St Petersburg region. The European equity would be in order to secure markets for the power.
Preliminary work is to begin in 2009 with construction start in 2010 and the first unit is planned to come on line in 2015, after 54 months construction, supplying Energoatom. It is expected to cost EUR 4 billion and the second one following four years behind about half that. The plan was approved in mid 2008 as an amendment to the federal target program (FTP) of 2007, and Rosatom approved construction in August 2008. Czech power utility CEZ has expressed interest in the project.
The Baltic plant and two other ventures with Rusal (see below) will require private equity.
UES was reported to support construction of new nuclear plants in the regions of Yaroslavl, Chelyabinsk (South Urals) and Vladimir, with two to four units at each.
Further Power Reactors Proposed, uncertain status
| Unit |
Type |
MWe each gross |
Start-up |
| Leningrad II 5-6 |
PWR AES-2006 |
1200 |
|
| Kursk II 1-4 |
PWR AES-2006 |
1200 |
|
| Smolensk II 1-4 |
PWR AES-2006 |
1200 |
|
| North-west 1 & 2 |
BWR VK-300 |
300 |
|
| Tatar 1 - 3 |
PWR AES-2006 |
1200 |
|
| Beloyarsk 5 |
BREST |
300 |
|
| Yaroslavl |
? |
|
|
| Chelyabinsk (S.Urals) |
? |
|
|
| Vladimir |
? |
|
|
| Plants with low priority for UES: |
| Bashkira 1-4 |
PWR |
|
|
| Balokovo 5 & 6 |
PWR for Rusal smelter |
1000 |
2013? |
| Far East 1-4 |
PWR, 1/3 for Rusal smelter |
1000 |
|
The BN-800 Beloyarsk-4 fast reactor designed by OKBM is intended to replace the BN-600 unit 3 and the US$ 1.22 billion project may become international, with Japanese and Chinese involvement. Construction has been delayed by lack of funds, but as of mid 2006 the project is expected to resume with adequate funding (of US$ 2.12 billion) for 2012 start-up. The construction funds include $280 million in 2008 and $500 million in each of 2009 and 2010.
In 2006 the major aluminium producer SUAL (which in March 2007 became part of RUSAL) signed an agreement with Rosatom to support investment in new nuclear capacity at Kola, to power expanded aluminium smelting there from 2013. Four units totalling 1000 MWe were envisaged for Kola stage 2 underpinned by a 25-year contract with SUAL, but economic feasibility is in doubt and the project appears to have been dropped and replaced by two others.
Since 2007 Rosatom and RUSAL, now the world's largest aluminium and alumina producer, have been undertaking a feasibility study on a nuclear power generation and aluminium smelter at Primorye in Russia's far east. This proposal is taking shape as a US$ 10 billion project involving four 1000 MWe reactors and a 600,000 t/yr smelter with Atomstroyexport having a controlling share in the nuclear side. The smelter will require about one third of the output from 4 GWe, and electricity exports to China and North and South Korea are envisaged.
In October 2007 a $7 billion project was announced for the world's biggest aluminium smelter in the Saratov region, complete with two new nuclear reactors to power it. The existing Balakovo nuclear power plant of four 950 MWe reactors would be expanded with two more, serving a 1.05 million tonne per year aluminium smelter to be built nearby by RUSAL. This would require about 15 billion kWh/yr - a little over one third of the output of the expanded power plant. Aluminium smelting is energy-intensive and requires reliable low-cost electricity to be competitive. Increasingly it is also carbon-constrained - this smelter will emit about 1.7 million tonnes of CO2 per year just from anode consumption.
RUSAL has announced an agreement with the regional government which will become effective when the nuclear plant expansion is approved by Rosatom. Balakovo units 5 & 6 have been listed as prospective for some time but were dropped off the 2007-08 Rosatom plan for completing 26 new power reactors by 2020 as they were low priority for UES grid supply. Balakovo is on the Volga R. 800 km SE of Moscow. Feasibility studies for both RUSAL projects are due to be completed at the end of 2008.
In addition, 5 GW of thermal power plants (mostly AST-500 integral PWR type) for district and industrial heat will be constructed at Arkhangelesk (4 VK-300 units commissioned 2009-16), Voronezh (2 units 2012-18), Saratov, Dimitrovgrad and (small-scale, KLT-40 type PWR) at Chukoyka and Severodvinsk. Russian nuclear plants provided 11.4 PJ of district heating in 2005, and this is expected to increase to 30.8 PJ by about 2010. (A 1000 MWe reactor produces about 95 PJ per year internally to generate the electricity.)
Rosatom's long-term strategy up to 2050 involves moving to inherently safe nuclear plants using fast reactors with a closed fuel cycle and MOX fuel. Fossil fuels for power generation to be largely phased out. Starting 2020-25 it is envisaged that fast neutron reactors will play an increasing role in Russia, and an optimistic scenario has expansion to 90 GWe nuclear capacity by 2050.
Rosatom is also planning to construct seven or eight floating nuclear power plants by 2015. The first has been under construction since April 2007 with intended completion in 2010 to supply the Severodvinsk region and the second is planned for 2012 commissioning at Pevek on the Chukotka peninsula in the far east. Each has two 35 MWe KLT-40S nuclear reactors (see next section). Five will be used by Gazprom for offshore oil and gas field development and for operations on the Kola and Yamal peninsulas. Another was planned for Kamchatka region, also in the far east of the country. Further far east sites being considered are Yakutia and Taimyr. Electricity cost is expected to be much lower than from present alternatives. In 2007 an agreement was signed with the Sakha Republic (Yakutia region) to build a floating plant for its northern parts, using smaller ABV reactors.
The first floating nuclear power plant was expected to cost US$ 337 million (including $30 million already spent in design) - 80% financed by Energoatom and 20% by Sevmash. The keel was laid in April 2007 at Sevmash and operation was expected in mid 2010, but in August 2008 Rosatom cancelled the contract and transferred construction to the Baltiysky Zavod shipyard at St Petersburg, which has experience in building nuclear icebreakers. A new site for its deployment is to be approved in October 2008.
The main reactor component supplier is OMZ's Komplekt-Atom-Izhora facility which is doubling the production of large forgings so as to be able to manufacture three or four pressure vessels per year from 2011. OMZ is expected to produce the forgings for all new domestic AES-2006 model VVER-1200 nuclear reactors (four per year from 2016) plus exports. At present Izhora can produce the heavy high-quality forgings required for Russia's VVER-1000 pressurized water reactors at the rate of two per year. These forgings include reactor pressure vessels, steam generators, and heavy piping. In 2008 the company is reconstructing its 12,000 tonne hydraulic press, claimed to be the largest in Europe, and a second stage of work will increase that capacity to 15,000 tonnes.
Reactor technology
The guidelines for developing large-scale nuclear power in Russia were set out as follows early in the decade:
- Power costs not more than 3 cents/kWh,
- Capital costs under US$ 1000/kW,
- Service life at least 50 years,
- Utilisation rate at least 90%.
The main reactor design now being deployed is the V-320 version of the VVER-1000, from OKB Gidropress (Experimental Design Bureau Hydropress), with 950-1000 MWe net output.
Advanced versions of this VVER-1000 with western instrument and control systems have been built at Tianwan in China and are being built at Kudankulam in India - as AES-91 and AES-92 nuclear power plants respectively. The former was bid for Finland in 2002. The latter was bid for Sanmen and Yangjiang in China in 2005 and was accepted for Belene in Bulgaria in 2006. (Major components of the two designs are the same except for slightly taller pressure vessel in AES-91, but cooling and safety systems differ. The AES-92 has greater passive safety features, the AES-91 has extra seismic protection. The AES-91 is the first plant to have a core-catcher.)
About 2005 Rosatom (the Federal Atomic Energy Agency) promoted the basic design for VVER-1500 pressurised water reactors by Gidropress as a priority. Design was expected to be complete in 2007.
However, this plan was overtaken by development of the AES-2006 power plant incorporating a third-generation standardised VVER-1200 reactor of 1170 MWe, This is an evolutionary development of the well-proven VVER-1000 in the AES-92 plant, with longer life (50 years not 30), greater power, and greater efficiency (36.56% instead of 31.6%). The lead units will be built at Novovoronezh II, to start operation in 2012-13 followed by Leningrad II for 2013-14. Leningrad II is quoted as the reference plant for further units at Tianwan in China.
An AES-2006 plant will consist of two of these OKB Gidropress reactor units expected to run for 50 years with capacity factor of 90%. Capital cost was said to be US$ 1200/kW (though the first contract of them is more like $2100/kW) and construction time 54 months. They have enhanced safety including that related to earthquakes and aircraft impact with some passive safety features, double containment and core damage frequency of 1x10-7. Thermal efficiency is 36.56%.
Main Russian PWR nuclear power reactors
(in order of development)*
| Generic reactor type |
Reactor model |
Power plant |
| VVER-440 |
V-230 |
|
V-213 |
|
| VVER-1000 |
V-320 |
|
V-392 |
AES-91 |
V-392 |
AES-92 |
| VVER-1200 |
|
AES-2006 |
| VVER-1500 |
|
|
* Early V numbers referred to models which were widely built in several countries, eg V-230, V-320. Then the V-392 seemed to be a general export design. Later V numbers are project-specific, eg V-446 at Bushehr, Iran, V-412 at Kudankulam, India, V-428 at Tianwan, China and V-466 was bid for Olkiluoto, Finland and is being built at Belene, Bulgaria.
In September 2006 the technology future for Russia was focused on four elements:
- Serial construction of AES-2006 units,
- Fast breeder BN-800,
- Small and medium reactors - KLT-40 and VBER-300 (100-300 MWe),
- HTGR.
Following progress on these the physically larger VVER-1500 design may be completed.
The BN-800 fast neutron (bystry neutron) reactor being built by OKBM at Beloyarsk is designed to supersede the BN-600 unit there and utilise MOX fuel with both reactor-grade and weapons plutonium. Further BN-800 units are planned and a BN-1800 is being designed for operation from 2020. This represents a technological advantage for Russia and has significant export or collaborative potential with Japan.
After many years of promoting the idea, Rosatom approved construction of a nuclear power plant on a barge to supply 70 MWe of power plus 586 GJ/hr of heat to Severodvinsk, Archangelsk region. The contract to build the first unit was let to the Sevmash shipyard in May 2006. Two OKBM KLT-40S reactors derived from those in icebreakers, but with low-enriched fuel (less than 20% u-235), will be mounted on a 21,500 tonne, 144 m long barge.
Refuelling interval is 3-4 years on site, and at the end of a 12-year operating cycle the whole plant is returned to a shipyard (Zvezdochka has been mentioned) for a 2-year overhaul and storage of used fuel, before being returned to service. The larger end of the range uses a pair of 325 MWe VBER-300 reactors on a 49,000 tonne barge, and a smaller floating power plant could use a single RITM-200 reactor providing 55 MWe, this being a possible successor to the KLT-40. Exports of combined power and desalination units is planned, with China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Algeria, Cape Verde and Argentina being mentioned as potential buyers, though Russia would probably retain ownership of the plant with operational responsibility and simply sell the output.
OKBM's VBER-300 PWR is a 295 MWe unit developed from naval power plants and was originally envisaged in pairs as a floating nuclear power plant. As a cogeneration plant it is rated at 200 MWe and 1900 GJ/hr for heat or desalination. The reactor is designed for 60 year life and 90% capacity factor. It is now planned to develop it as a land-based unit with Kazatomprom, with a view to exports, and the first unit will be built in Kazakhstan.
The VK-300 boiling water reactor is being developed by the Research & Development Institute of Power Engineering (NIKIET) for both power (250 MWe) and desalination (150 MWe plus 1675 GJ/hr). It has evolved from the VK-50 BWR at Dimitrovgrad, but uses standard components wherever possible, eg the reactor vessel of the VVER-1000. A feasibility study on building 4 cogeneration VK-300 units at Archangelsk was favourable, delivering 250 MWe power and 31.5 TJ/yr heat.
Another reactor type with advanced safety features which has been under development is the 640 MWe V-407 (VVER-640), developed by Gidropress jointly with Siemens (now Areva NP). However, after beginning construction of the first at Sosnovy Bor, funds ran out and it has disappeared from recent plans.
A development of the RBMK was the MKER-800, with much improved safety systems and containment, but this too has been shelved. Like the RBMK itself, it was designed by VNIPIET (All-Russia Science Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering Technology) at St Petersburg.
In the 1970-80s OKBM undertook substantial research on high temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs). In the 1990s it took a lead role in the international GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor) project based on a General Atomics (US) design. Preliminary design was completed in 2001 and the prototype is to be constructed at Seversk (Tomsk-7, Siberian Chemical Combine) by 2010, with construction of the first 4-module power plant (4x285 MWe) by 2015. Initially it will be used to burn pure ex-weapons plutonium, and replace production reactors which still supply electricity there. But in the longer-term perspective HTGRs are seen as important for burning actinides and later for hydrogen production.
The BREST lead-cooled fast reactor (Bystry Reaktor so Svintsovym Teplonositelem) is another innovation, from NIKIET, with the first unit being proposed for Beloyarsk-5. See Advanced Reactors paper.
In 2008 Rosatom and Russian Machines Co put together a joint venture to build a prototype 100 MWe SVBR reactor. SVBR is modular lead-bismuth cooled fast neutron reactor from OKB Gidropress. If built in clusters of 10 to 16 units it is claimed to be competitive with VVER types. See Small Nuclear Reactors paper.
From 2001 Russia has been a lead country in the IAEA Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO). In 2006 Russia joined the Generation-IV International Forum, for which NEA provides the secretariat. Russia Russia is also a member of the NEA's Multinational Design Evaluation Program which is increasingly important in rationalising reactor design criteria.
In March 2008 AtomEnergoProm signed a general framework agreement with Japan's Toshiba Corporation under which they will explore collaboration in the civil nuclear power business. They are to start feasibility studies to consider cooperation in areas including design and engineering for the construction of new nuclear power plants, manufacturing and maintenance of large equipment, and "front-end civilian nuclear fuel cycle business". The companies say that the "complementary relations" could lead to the establishment of a strategic partnership. Toshiba owns 77% of US reactor builder Westinghouse and is also involved with other reactor technology.
Improving reactor performance
A major current emphasis is the improvement in operation of present reactors with better fuels and greater efficiency in their use, closing much of the gap between Western and Russian performance. Fuel developments include the use of burnable poisons - gadolinium and erbium, as well as structural changes to the fuel assemblies.
With uranium-gadolinium fuel and structural changes, VVER-1000 fuel has been pushed out to 4-year endurance and VVER-440 fuel even longer. For VVER-1000, five years is envisaged by 2010, with enrichment levels increasing nearly by one third (from 3.77% to 4.87%) in that time, average burn-up going up by 40% (to 57.7 GWd/t) and operating costs dropping by 5%. With a 3 x 18 month operating cycle, burn-up would be lower (51.3 GWd/t) but load factor could increase to 87%. Comparable improvements were envisaged for later-model VVER-440 units.
For RBMK reactors the most important development has been the introduction of uranium-erbium fuel at all units, though structural changes have helped. As enrichment and erbium content are increased (eg from 2.6% to 2.8% and 0.6% respectively) increased burn-up is possible. Leningrad has implemented the higher-enriched fuel and Kursk is starting to do so.
For the BN-600 fast reactor, improved fuel means up to 560 days between refuelling.
Beyond these initiatives, the basic requirements for fuel have been set as: fuel operational lifetime extended to 6 years, improved burn-up of 70 GWd/tU, and improved fuel reliability. In addition, many nuclear plants will need to be used in load-following mode, and fuel which performs well under variable load conditions will be required.
All RBMK reactors now use recycled uranium from VVER reactors and some has also been used experimentally at Kalinin-2 and Kola-2 VVERs. It is intended to extend this. A related task is to utilise surplus weapons-grade plutonium in MOX fuel for up to seven VVER-1000 reactors from 2008 and the one fast reactor (Beloyarsk-3) from 2007.
Uranium resources and mining
Russia has substantial economic resources of uranium, with about 10% of world reasonably assured resources plus inferred resources up to US$ 130/kg - 546,000 tonnes U (2007 Red Book). Exploration expenditure has nearly doubled in two years to about US$ 52 million in 2008.
In 2007 it produced some 3413 tonnes of uranium from mines but this needs to increase substantially to match increased domestic demand. Estimate for 2008 is 3880 tonnes. In 2006 there were three mining projects, in 2008 there are three more under construction and a further three projected. Cost of production in remote areas is said to be US$ 60-90/kg.
AtomRedMetZoloto (ARMZ) is the state-owned company which took over Tenex and TVEL uranium exploration and mining assets in 2007, as a subsidiary Atomenergoprom. It inherited 19 projects with a total uranium resource of about 400,000 tonnes, of which 340,000 tonnes are in Elkonskiy uranium region and 60,000 tonnes in Streltsovskiy and Vitimskiy regions. All this had been transferred from the Federal Subsoil Resources Management Agency (Rosnedra).
ARMZ is responsible for all Russian uranium mine assets and also Russian shares in foreign joint ventures. In 2008 78.6% of Priargunsky, all of Khiagda and 97.85% of Dalur was transferred to ARMZ.
Present production by ARMZ is principally from the Transbaikal or Chita region of SE Siberia near the Chinese and Mongolian borders, where major uranium deposits were discovered in 1967, leading to large-scale mining, originally with few environmental controls. Krasnokamensk is the main town serving the mines.
Several large underground mines operated by Priargunsky Industrial Mining & Chemical Union supply low-grade ore to a central mill. Historical production from Priargunsky is reported to be 130,000 tU (some from open cut mines) and current known resources (RAR + IR) are quoted as 133,000 tU at 0.159%U. 2007 production was 3037 tU and current capacity is 3500 tU/yr, about one tenth from heap leaching. Some production has been exported to France, Sweden and Spain.
A lesser amount of production is from new operations at Khiagda in Buryatiya about 500 km northwest of Priargunsky's operations, and from Dalur in the Kurgan region between Chelyabinsk and Omsk, just east of the Urals. Both are low-cost (US$ 40/kg) in situ leach (ISL) operations.
In 2008 ARMZ said that it intends to triple production to 10,300 tU per year by 2015, with some help from Cameco, Mitsui and local investors. ARMZ plans to invest RUR203 billion (US$7.3 billion) in the development of uranium mining in Russia in 2008-2015. It aims for 20,000 tU per year by 2024.
Production would be expanded at Priargunsky from 3000 to 5000 tU/yr by 2020, with Mine #6 construction to begin in 2009 for stage 1 production in 2019 and stage 2 in 2024. Mine #8 is due to begin producing in 2011. Production at Dalur is to be increased from 350 to 1000 tU/yr by 2015 (expanding from the Dalmatovskoye deposit to Khoklovskoye then Dobrovolskoye) and at Khiagda (Khiagdinskoye deposit) from 30 to 300 tU/yr by 2012, 1000 tU/yr by 2015 and 2000 tU/yr by 2020. Total cost is projected at 67 billion rubles ($2.8 billion), mostly at Priargunsky, with RUR 4.8 billion there by end of 2009 including a new 500 tonne per day sulphuric acid plant.
Development of Olovskoye and Gornoye deposits* in the Transbaikal region near Priargunsky and Khiagda would add 600 tU/yr production from each by 2017 for 135 billion rubles ($5.7 billion) and development of the Elkon project with several mines in the Sakha republic (Yakutia) some 1200 km north-northeast of these would ramp up from 2013 to 3000 tU in 2015 and 5000 tU/yr by 2020, for RUR90 billion ($3.8 billion) - confirming 2006 plans.
* 2006 plans were for 2000t/yr at new prospects in Chita Region and Buryatia (Gornoye, Berezovoye, Olovskoye, Talakanskoye properties etc.), plus some 3000t at new deposits.
In 2007 newly-formed ARMZ set up three companies to undertake this in the Yakutia region:
- Uranium Mining Company Gornoye to develop the Gornoye and Berezovoye mines in the Krasnochikoysky and Uletovsky districts in Chita, with underground mining and some heap leach (ore grade 0.226%U);
- Olovskaya Mining & Chemical Company to develop the Olovskoye deposits in the Chernyshevsk district of Chita region with underground, open cut and heap leach (ore grade 0.88%U); and
- Elkonsky Mining & Chemical Combine to develop the substantial Elkon deposits.
- JSC Lunnoye is set up to develop a small deposit separately in connection with Elkon.
The Elkon two also involve the JSC Development Corporation of South Yakutia and aim to attract funding from outside ARMZ to develop infrastructure and mining in a public-private partnership.
There are eight deposits in the Elkon area of southern Yakutia with resources of 320,000 tU (RAR + IR) at average 0.146%U, with gold by-product: Elkon, Elkon Plateau, Kurung, Neprokhodimoye, Druzhnoye (southern deposits), as well as Severnoye and Zona Interesnoye. Lunnoye is being developed jointly by ARMZ and a gold mining company as a pilot project to gain practical experience in the region in a polymetallic orebody. First production is expected in 2013 ramping up to 5000 tU/yr by 2024, making it Russia's largest uranium mining complex. However, it is remote, and mining will be underground, incurring significant development costs.
Plans announced in 2006 for 28,600 t/yr U3O8 output by 2020, 18,000t of this from Russia* and the balance from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Mongolia have since taken shape. In April 2007 an agreement was signed with Mongolia for uranium exploration, mining and processing.
* See details for April 2008 ARMZ plans. In 2007 TVEL applied for the Istochnoye, Kolichkanskoye, Dybrynskoye, Namarusskoye and Koretkondinskoye deposits with 30,000 tU in proved and probable reserves close to the Khiagda mine in Buryatia.
From foreign projects: Zarechnoye 1000 t, Southern Zarechnoye 1000 t, Akbastau 3000 t (all in Kazakhstan); Aktau (Uzbekistan) 500 t, Novo-Konstantinovskoye (Ukraine) 2500 t. In addition Russia would like to participate in development of Erdes deposit in Mongolia (500t) as well as in Northern Kazakhstan deposits Semizbai (Akmolonsk Region) and Kosachinoye.
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In 2006 Priargunsky won a tender to develop Argunskoye and Zherlovoye deposits in the Chita with about 40,000 tU reserves. Khiagdinsk, Dolmatovsk and Khokhlovsk have also been identified as three new mines to be developed.
In May 2007 Tenex (now ARMZ) won its bid to develop eight deposits in the Elkon area of southern Yakutia with reported resources of 320,000 tU: Elkon, Elkon Plateau, Kurung, Neprokhodimoye, Druzhnoye, Severnoye, Interesnoye & Lunnoye. First production is expected in 2013 ramping up to 5000 tU/yr by 2020, making it Russia's largest uranium mining complex. Some US$ 3.6 billion is to be invested in the Elkon project.
In October 2006 Japan's Mitsui & Co with Tenex agreed to undertake a feasibility study for a uranium mine in eastern Russia to supply Japan. First production from the Yuzhnaya mine in Sakha (Yakutia) Republic is envisaged for 2009. Mitsui has an option to take 25% of the project, and is funding $6 million of the feasibility study. Construction of the Yuzhnaya mine is likely to cost US$ 245 million, with production reaching 1000 tU/yr by 2015. This would represent the first foreign ownership of a Russian uranium mine.
Two uranium mining joint ventures have been established in Kazakhstan with the intention of providing 6000 tU/yr for Tenex (now ARMX) from 2007. (see Kazakhstan paper)
Following from previous deals with Tenex, In November 2007 Cameco signed an agreement with ARMZ. The two companies are to create joint ventures to explore for and mine uranium in both Russia and Canada, starting with identified deposits in northwestern Russia and the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Nunavut.
The Federal Subsoil Resources Management Agency (Rosnedra) said in late 2008 that it is planning to transfer about 100,000 tonnes of uranium resources to miners, notably ARMZ, in 2009-10, and 14 projects, mainly small to medium deposits, have been prepared for licensing then. They are located mainly in Streltsovskiy, Zauralskiy and Vitimskiy uranium regions.
The projects prepared for licensing include:
in Chita Region - Zherlovskoye, Pyatiletnee, Dalnee and Durulguevskoye;
in Republic of Buratiya - Talakanskoye, Vitlausskoye, Imskoye, Tetrakhskoye, and Dzhilindinskoye;
in Kurgan Region - Dobrovolnoye;
in Khabarovsk Territory - Lastochka;
in Republic of Tyva - Ust-Uyuk and Onkazhinskoye;
in Republic of Khakassia - Primorskoye.
All these projects have 76,600 tonnes of reasonably assured and inferred resources, plus 106,000 tonnes of undiscovered resources.
In addition to ARMZ, private companies may also participate in tenders for mining the smaller and remote uranium deposits being prepared for licensing. ARMZ is open to relevant investment projects with strategic partners, and Lunnoye deposit is an example where a private company Zoloto Seligdara is partnering with ARMZ.
Secondary supplies:
Some uranium also comes from reprocessing used fuel from VVER-440, fast neutron and submarine reactors - some 2500 tonnes of uranium has so far been recycled into RBMK reactors.
Also arising from reprocessing used fuels, some 32 tonnes of plutonium has been accumulated for use in MOX. Added to this there is now 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium from military stockpiles to be used in MOX fuel for BN-600 and BN-800 fast neutron reactors at Beloyarsk, supported by a $400 million payment from the USA. Some of this weapons plutonium may also be used in the MHR high-temperature gas-cooled reactor under development at Seversk.
The uranium supply is expected to suffice for at least 80 years, or more if recycling is increased. However, from 2020 it is intended to make more use of fast neutron reactors.
Fuel Cycle Facilities: front end
Many of Russia's fuel cycle facilities were originally developed for military use and hence are located in former closed cities (names bracketed) in the country.
The main operating conversion plant is at Angarsk near Irkutsk in Siberia, with 18,700 tonnes U/yr capacity. Elektrostal, 50 km east of Moscow, has 700 tU/yr capacity for reprocessed uranium from VVER-440 fuel. Some conversion of Kazakh uranium has been undertaken for west European company Nukem.
The Angarsk plant is part of the JSC Angarsk Electrolysis & Chemical Combine in the Irkutsk region, whose prime function is conversion and enrichment of uranium.
Four enrichment plants totalling 24 million kg SWU/yr of centrifuge capacity operate at Novouralsk near Yekaterinburg in the Urals, and Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45), Seversk near Tomsk and Angarsk near Irkutsk - all in Siberia. The first two service foreign demand and the last specialises in enriching reprocessed uranium.
The Novouralsk plant is part of the Urals Electrochemical Combine in the Sverdlovsk region.
The Zelenogorsk plant is also known as the PA Electrochemical Plant in the Krasnoyarsk region.
The Seversk plant is part of the JSC Siberian Chemical Combine, Tomsk region, which opened in 1953. It is about 15 km from Tomsk. As well as the enrichment plant it has several plutonium production reactors (now closed), a MOX plant and other facilities.
Diffusion technology was phased out by 1992 and all plants now operate modern gas centrifuges, with further fitting of 8th generation equipment in progress. The last 6th & 7th generation centrifuges were set up in 2005, 8th generation equipment has been supplied since 2004, now at about 240,000 units per year and are replacing 5th generation models. (6th generation units are still produced for export to China.) The technology is attributed by Nuclear.Ru to VNIPIET in St Petersburg.
The Novouralsk plant is the largest (10 M SWU/yr) and can enrich to 30% U-235 (for research and BN fast reactors), the others only to 5% U-235. The JSC Electrochemical Plant (ECP) at Zelenogorsk is 5.8 M SWU/yr and is introducing ISO9001 quality assurance system. It is also the site for downblending of ex-weapons uranium for sale to the USA. A significant proportion of the capacity of both plants is taken up by enrichment of former tails (depleted uranium), including for west European comapnies Areva and Urenco. Seversk is about 3 M SWU/yr and Angarsk about 2.6 million SWU/yr.
Some recycled uranium is enriched by the Siberian Chemical Combine at Seversk for Areva.
In 2008 Kazatomprom set up a JV with Tenex for financing a 5 million SWU/yr increment to the Angarsk plant. Each party will contribute about US$ 1.6 billion and hold 50% equity. This is distinct from the IUEC.
The International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) is being set up at Angarsk, near Irkutsk - the smallest of three Siberian plants and part of the Angarsk Electrochemical Combine (see following section). Two projects are under way to increase the capacity of this from 2.6 to 4.2 and then to almost 10 million SWU/yr by 2015. The latter stage will be with Kazakhstan and other IUEC partners, who will share the $2.5 billion cost. See below.
At Zelenogorsk, Tenex is building a 10,000 t/yr deconversion (defluorination) plant under a technology transfer agreement with Areva NC, so that depleted uranium can be stored long-term as uranium oxide. (It is the same as one at Pierrelatte.)
Fuel fabrication is undertaken by JSC TVEL, which supplies 74 nuclear power plants in Russia and abroad as well as 30 research reactors and fuel for naval and icebreaker reactors. Its operations are certified against ISO 9001.
TVEL has two fuel fabrication plants:
- the huge Maschinostroitelny Zavod (MSZ) at Elektrostal 50 km east of Moscow - known as Elemash,
- Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant (NCCP) in Siberia, and
- Chepetsk Mechanical Plant (CMP) near Glazov in Udmurtiya makes zirconium cladding and also some uranium products.
Most fuel pellets for RBMK and VVER-1000 reactors were being made at the Ulba plant at Ust Kamenogorsk in Kazakhstan, but Elemash and Novosibirsk have increased production. MSZ produces fuel assemblies for both Russian and west European rectors using fresh and recycled uranium. It also fabricates research reactor and icebreaker fuel. Novosibirsk produces mainly VVER 440 & 1000 fuel. MSZ/Elemash is the principal exporter of fuel assemblies.
TVEL's Moscow Composite Metal Plant designs and makes control and protection systems for nuclear power reactors.
International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC)
The IUEC concept was inaugurated at the end of 2006 in collaboration with Kazakhstan, and in March 2007 the IAEA agreed to set up a working group and continue developing the proposal. Ukraine and Armenia have decided to participate in IUEC, while accession negotiations proceed with South Korea, Finland, and Belgium, also Mongolia is reported to be interested. Late in 2008 Ukraine's Nuclear Fuel Holding Company took a 10% stake in the IUEC. In September 2008 Rostechnadzor licensed the Centre.
The centre is to provide assured supplies of low-enriched uranium for power reactors to new nuclear power states and those with small nuclear programs, giving them equity in the project, but without allowing them access to the enrichment technology. Russia will maintain majority ownership. IUEC will sell both enrichment services (SWU) and enriched uranium product.
The existing enrichment plant at Angarsk will feed the IUEC and accordingly has been removed from the category of "national strategic installations", though it has never been part of the military program. In February 2007 the IUEC was entered into the list of Russian nuclear facilities eligible for implementation of IAEA safeguards. In September 2007 the joint stock company Angarsk IUEC was registered with 10% Kazatomprom ownership and the balance Techsnabexport. This share will be sold down to other partners, with Techsnabexport holding only 51% eventually. In due course the IUEC may take equity in JSC Angarsk Electrolysis & Chemical Combine (AECC). The USA has expressed support for the IUEC at Angarsk.
Development of the IUEC will be in three phases:
1. Use part of the existing capacity at Angarsk in cooperation with Kazatomprom and under IAEA supervision,
2. Expand capacity (perhaps double) with funding from new partners,
3. Full internationalisation with involvement of many customer nations under IAEA auspices.
Russia has also announced that guaranteed reserves of 160 tonnes of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride will be held at IUEC as a fuel bank under IAEA control and available at IAEA discretion - equivalent to two full core loads for a 1000 MWe reactor.
Used Fuel and Reprocessing
Russian policy is to close the fuel cycle as far as possible and utilise recycled uranium, and eventually also to use plutonium in MOX fuel. However, its achievements in doing this are limited.
At present the used fuel from RBMK reactors and from VVER-1000 reactors is stored (mostly at reactor sites) and not reprocessed.
Used fuel from VVER-440 reactors, the BN-600 and from naval reactors is reprocessed at the Mayak Chemical Combine's 400 t/yr RT-1 plant (Chelyabinsk-65) at Ozersk, near Kyshtym 70 km northwest of Chelyabinsk in the Urals. The original reprocessing plant at the site was hastily built in the mid 1940s, for military plutonium production in association with five producer reactors (the last shut down in 1990). The RT-1 plant started up in 1971 and employs the Purex process. Recently it has run at about one third capacity, following the loss of foreign contracts. About 93% of its feed is from Russian and Ukrainian VVER-440 reactors, about 3% from naval sources or icebreakers and 3% from BN-600. Recycled uranium is enriched to 2.6% U-235 by mixing RepU product from different sources and used in fresh RBMK fuel, while separated plutonium is stored. High-level wastes are vitrified. and stored. Plans to upgrade the RT-1 plant and enable it to take VVER-1000 fuel, have been approved and were to be completed in 2008. Used fuel storage capacity is being increased from 6000 to 9000 tonnes.
The partly-built larger RT-2 plant at Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26) in Siberia has been cancelled and was to be dismantled. However, this may be under review and it could form part of the new Global Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative (see international section below). A 6000 tonne pool storage was built in 1985 and some VVER-1000 used fuel is stored there pending reprocessing. This RT-2 pool storage is planned to be refurbished. (A dual-purpose graphite-moderated reactor principally producing military plutonium, with associated underground reprocessing plant, is also there.)
Since 2004 an 8600 tonne dry storage facility for used fuel has been under construction at Zheleznogorsk and this is due to be completed in 2010 at a cost of about US$ 500 million for the Mining & Chemical Combine (MCC). Initially it will take RBMK fuel from Leningrad and Kursk power plants. Further stages will increase capacity to 36,000 tonnes by 2016.
A 60 t/yr commercial MOX fabrication plant was planned at Zheleznogorsk (the site of the ADE2 military plutonium production reactor which is due to shut down in 2010). Another MOX plant for disposing of military plutonium is planned at Seversk (Tomsk-7) in Siberia, to the same design as its US equivalent. (Seversk had the other two dual-purpose but basically military plutonium production reactors, totalling 2500 MWt. One of these - ADE4 - was shut down in April 2008, the other - ADE5 - in June 2008.) A pilot MOX plant is at Mayak.
No waste repository is yet available, though site selection is proceeding in granite on the Kola Peninsula.
Decommissioning
Five civil reactors are being decommissioned: an experimental 50 MWe LWGR type at Obninsk which started up in 1954, two early and small LWGR (AMB-100) units - Beloyarsk 1 & 2, and two larger prototype VVER-440 units at Novovoronezh, a V-210 and V-365 type. The last four were shut down 1981-90 and await dismantling. The fuel has been removed from these and that from Novovoronezh has been shipped to centralised storage in Zheleznogorsk and will be stored there for about ten years before reprocessing. The Beloyarsk fuel is still on site since reprocessing technology for it is not available.
Two nuclear powered icebreakers have been decommissioned: Lenin and Sibir, also the support vessel: Lepse which holds some used nuclear fuel from the Arctic fleet.
Several plutonium production reactors also remain to be decommissioned.
Several plutonium production reactors also remain to be decommissioned.
The government said it plans to spend some $5 billion to 2015 on decommissioning and waste management.
Organisation
The State Corporation (SC) Rosatom took over Russia's nuclear industry in 2007, from the Federal Atomic Energy Agency (FAEA, also known as Rosatom). This was formed from the Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom) in 2004, which had succeeded a Soviet ministry in 1992. The civil parts of the industry, with a history of over 60 years, are consolidated under AtomEnergoProm (AEP).
During 2008 there has been a major reorganisation or "privatisation" of nuclear industry entities involving change from Federal State Unitary Enterprises (FSUE) to Joint Stock Companies (JSC), with most or all of the shares held by AtomEnergoProm. By mid August 2008, 38 of 55 civil nuclear FSUEs had been reformed. Some renaming occurred due to new restrictions on the use of "Russia" or derivatives (eg "Ros") in JSC names.
The State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom (as distinct from Rosatom agency) is a non-profit company set up in 2007 to hold all nuclear assets on behalf of the state. In particular, it will hold all the shares in the civil holding company AtomEnergoProm (AEP). It took over the functions of the Rosatom agency and works with the Ministries of Industry and Energy (MIE) and of Economic Development and Trade (MEDT) but does not report to any particular ministry.
SC Rosatom divisions are:
- Nuclear defence
- Nuclear & Radiation Safety (now including Radon - see below)State Nuclear Energy Corporation Rosatom
- Nuclear Power - Atomenergoprom (AEP)
- Research & Training
- Atomflot - Arctic fleet of 7 nuclear icebreakers and one nuclear merchant ship.
AtomEnergoProm (AEP) is the single vertically-integrated state holding company for Russia's nuclear power sector, separate from the military complex. It was set up at the end of 2007 to include uranium production, engineering, design, reactor construction, power generation and research institutes in its several branches, but not used fuel reprocessing or disposal facilities for the time being. The April 2007 Presidential decree establishing it specifies nuclear materials, which may be owned exclusively by the state, lists Russian legal entities allowed to possess nuclear materials and facilities, existing joint stock companies to be incorporated into the AEP, and lists federal state unitary enterprises to be corporatized first and incorporated into the AEP at a later stage. Exclusive state ownership of nuclear materials had been seen as a barrier to competitiveness and other Russian corporate entities will now be allowed to hold civil-grade nuclear materials, under state control.
Entities from AEP itself down to various third-level subsidiaries will be joint stock companies eventually. Public investment in the bottom level operations is envisaged - the joint venture between Alstom and Atomenergomash to provide large turbines and generators is cited as an example.
JSC AtomEnergoProm's entities include the following (most are JSCs):
- Energoatom (formerly Rosenergoatom) - responsible for construction and operation of nuclear power generation,
- AtomRedMetZoloto (ARMZ) and ARMZ Uranium Holding - uranium supply - owns Russian mine assets and foreign JV shares
- TVEL - nuclear fuel fabrication,
- Technabexport (Tenex) - enrichment, foreign trade in uranium products and services,
- St Petersburg Atomenergoproekt - power plant design (now part of ASE),
- Moscow Atomenergoproekt (AEP) - power plant design,
- Nizhny-Novgorod Atomenergoproekt (AEP) - power plant design,
- Atomenergomash (AEM) - a group of companies building reactors,
- OKBM Afrikantov (formerly just OKBM - Experimental Design Bureau of Machine-building - Mashinostroyeniya) at Nizhny Novgorod- reactor design and construction,
- OKB Gidropress (Experimental Design Bureau pressurised water - Hydropress) at Podolsk - PWR reactor design
- Research & Development Institute for Power Engineering (NIKIET) at Moscow - power plant design (originally: submarine power plants)
- Atomstroyexport (ASE) - construction of nuclear plants abroad.
Atomstroyexport (ASE) emerged from the reorganisation as a closed joint stock company owned by Atomenergoprom (50.2%) and Gazprombank (49.8%). It is responsible for export of nuclear plants to China, Iran, India and Bulgaria.
In July 2008 the divisions of Atomernergoproekt were converted to joint stock companies, with all shares held by AEP. Then Atomstroyexport (ASE) merged with St Petersburg Atomenergoproekt, retaining the ASE name and consolidating reactor design and engineering with international marketing. St Petersburg AEP has worked with ASE on exported plants and is responsible for Leningrad II plant under construction.
Nizhny-Novgorod AEP is building plants at Volgodonsk and Kalinin, where it has linked with ASE to utilize some 1980s VVER equipment not required for Bulgaria's new Belene plant. Moscow AEP is building Novovoronezh (though some reports NN AEP is involved there).
Rostechnadzor is the regulator, set up in 1992, reporting direct to the President. Because of the links with military programs, a culture of secrecy pervaded the old Soviet nuclear power industry. After the 1986 Chernobyl accident, changes were made and a nuclear safety committee established. The State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety - Gosatomnadzor (GAN) succeeded this in 1992, being responsible for licensing, regulation and operational safety of all facilities, for safety in transport of nuclear materials, and for nuclear materials accounting. Its inspections can result in legal charges against operators. However, on some occasions when it suspended operating licences in the 1990s, Minatom successfully overrode this. In 2004 GAN was renamed the Federal Technological & Atomic Supervisory Service: Rostechnadzor.
Safety has evidently been improving at Russian nuclear power plants. In 1993 there were 29 incidents rating level 1 and higher on the INES scale, in 1994 there were nine, and since then to 2003, no more than four. Also, up until 2001 many employees received annual radiation doses of over 20 mSv, but since 2002 very few have done so.
UES was the electricity monopoly and also operated fossil fuel power stations, but it has now been broken up.
The former main nuclear construction company, Atommash, went bankrupt in 1995. It was then profoundly restructured and resurrected as EMK-Atommash before becoming JSC Energomash. However it now seems to have moved away from nuclear equipment. Other firms supplying the sector are also growing.
Early in 2006 Rosenergoatom set up a subsidiary to supply floating nuclear power plants (BNPPs) ranging in size from 70 to 600 MWe. The plants are designed by OKBM in collaboration with others. The pilot plant, now under construction, is 70 MWe plus heat output and incorporates two KLT-40S reactors based on those in icebreakers.
Radon is the organisation responsible for medical and industrial radioactive wastes. It has 16 storage sites for wastes up to intermediate level and operates some facilities at nuclear power and submarine decommissioning sites.
Exports
Soviet exports of enrichment services began in 1973, and Russia has strongly continued this, along with exports of radioisotopes. After 1990, uranium exports began, through Tenex.
Exports of nuclear fuel cycle goods and services topped US$ 2 billion in 1999, including $500 million in fuel assemblies and $1.6 billion in other goods and services. Exports were US$ 2.5 billion in 2001 and and rose to $3.5 billion in 2004. In 2006 they were again US$ 3.5 billion. Russia provides nearly one third of European uranium needs and is also selling diluted ex-military uranium for civil use through USA.
The latter "Megatonnes to Megawatts" program supplies about 15% of world reactor requirements for enriched uranum and is part of a US$ 12 billion deal between US and Russian governments, with a non-proliferation as well as commercial rationale. However, Rosatom confirmed in mid 2006 that no follow-on program of selling Russian high-enriched uranium from military stockpiles was anticipated once this program concludes in 2013. The 20-year program is equivalent to about 153,000 tonnes of natural uranium.
Rosatom claimed to be able to undercut world prices for nuclear fuel and services by some 30%.
It was also pushing ahead with plans to store and probably reprocess foreign spent fuel, and earlier the Russian parliament overwhelmingly supported a change in legislation to allow this. The proposal involved some 10% of the world's spent fuel over ten years, or perhaps up to 20,000 tonnes of spent fuel, to raise US$ 20 billion, two thirds of which would be invested in expanding civil nuclear power. In July 2001 President Putin signed into effect three laws including one to allow this import of spent nuclear fuel.
The President also set up a special commission to approve and oversee any spent fuel accepted, with five members each from the Duma, the Council, the government and presidential nominees, chaired by Dr Zhores Alferov, a parliamentarian, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Nobel Prize physicist.
This scheme was progressed in 2005 when the Duma ratified the Vienna Convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. However in July 2006 Rosatom announced it would not proceed with taking any foreign-origin used fuel.
Atomstroyexport (ASE) has three reactor construction projects abroad, all involving VVER-1000 units. First, it took over building a reactor for Iran at the Bushehr power plant, a project commenced by Siemens KWU but then aborted. Then it sold two large new AES-91 power plants to China for Jiangsu Tianwan at Lianyungang (both now operating) and two AES-92 units to India for Kudankulam (under construction, start-up due in 2008). It is likely that ASE will build a second unit at Bushehr and agreements have been signed for two more at Tianwan in China, which may be VVER-1200 type. In 2007 a memorandum of understanding was signed to build four more units at Kudankalam (reaffirmed early in 2008) and more elsewhere in India.
Russia's policy for building nuclear power plants in non-nuclear weapons states is to deliver on a turn-key basis including supply of all fuel and repatriation of used fuel for the life of the plant.
When China called for competitive bids for four large third-generation reactors to be built at Sanmen and Yangjiang, ASE unsuccessfully bid the AES-92 power plant for these.
In October 2006 its bid for two AES-92 units for Belene was accepted by Bulgaria. ASE leads a consortium including Areva NP and Bulgarian enterprises in the EUR 4.0 billion project.
ASE is reported to be under consideration by Fortum to supply Finland's sixth nuclear power reactor if it is built at Loviisa. It is also considered a leading contender to build two large reactors in Belarus, and will almost certainly build the first of a series of small reactors (probably VBER-300) in Kazakhstan.
A potentially wide-ranging memorandum of understanding with Enel of Italy is for cooperation on nuclear power projects in Eastern and Central Europe (where Enel has a major presence), using Russian technology. Most of these export prospects bring ASE into direct competition with western reactor vendors.
Since 2006 Rosatom has actively pursued cooperation deals in South Africa, Namibia, Chile and Morocco as well as with Egypt, Algeria, Vietnam and Bangladesh. Tenex has also entered agreements to mine and explore for uranium in South Africa (with local companies) and Canada (with Cameco).
In September 2008 ARMZ signed a MOU with a South Korean consortium headed by Kepco on strategic cooperation in developing uranium projects. This includes joint exploration, mining and sales of natural uranium in the Russian Federation and possibly beyond.
In February 2008 ASE formed an alliance with TechnoPromExport (TPE), an exporter of all other large-scale power generation types. This will rationalize their international marketing. TPE boasts of having completed 400 power projects in 50 countries around the world totalling some 87 GWe.
International Outlook
Overall there is increasing acceptance of the need to press ahead with nuclear energy in Russia while expanding the country's role internationally at both the front and the back end of the fuel cycle.
Russia's future international role will be built on its reputation over the last decade as a reliable commercial provider of fuel-related services. It is now engaged with international markets in nuclear energy, well beyond its traditional eastern European client states. With the consolidation of western nuclear fuel cycle vendors, the competition may be welcomed.
President Putin's Global Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative was announced early in 2006. This is in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 2005 proposal for Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA) and with the US Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The head of Rosatom said that he envisages Russia hosting four types of international nuclear fuel cycle service centres (INFCCs) as joint ventures financed by other countries. These would be secure and maybe under IAEA control. The first is an International Uranium Enrichment Centre (IUEC) - one of four or five proposed worldwide (see separate section). The second would be for reprocessing and storage of used nuclear fuel. The third would deal with training and certification of personnel, especially for emerging nuclear states. In this context there is a need for harmonized international standards, uniform safeguards and joint international centers. The fourth would be for R&D and to integrate new scientific achievements.
Regarding reactor design, Rosatom is keen to be involved in international projects for Generation IV reactor development and is keen to have international participation in fast neutron reactor development, as well as joint proposals for MOX fuel fabrication. In April 2007 Red Star, a government-owned design bureau, and US company Thorium Power agreed to collaborate on testing Thorium Power's seed and blanket fuel assemblies at the Kurchatov Institute with a view to using thorium-based fuel in VVER-1000 reactors. (see Thorium paper for details )
In 2006 the former working relationship with Kazakhstan in nuclear fuel supplies was rebuilt. Kazatomprom has agreed to a major long-term program of strategic cooperation with Russia in uranium and nuclear fuel supply, as well as development of small reactors, effectively reuniting the two countries' interests in future exports of nuclear fuel to China, Japan, Korea, the USA and Western Europe.
In April 2007 a joint venture company to manufacture the turbine and generator portions of new nuclear power plants was announced by French engineering group Alstom and JSC Atomenergomash. The 49:51 Alstom Atomenergomash LLC joint venture, in which both parties will invest EUR 200 million, is established at Podolsk, near Moscow. It includes the technology transfer of Alstom's state of the art Arabelle steam turbine and generator (available up to 1750 MWe). First production is expected in 2011 with output reaching three 1200 Me turbine and generator sets per year in 2013.
In September 2007 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) signed an agreement with Russia's Ural Turbine Works (UTZ) to manufacture, supply and service gas and steam turbines in the Russian market. Under the agreement, MHI, Japan's biggest machinery maker, will license its manufacturing technologies for large gas turbines and steam turbines to UTZ - part of the Renova Group. The agreement also calls for a joint venture to be established in Russia to provide after-sales service.
Research & Development
Russia has had substantial R&D on nuclear power for six decades. The premier establishment for this is the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, which has run twelve research reactors there, six of which are now shut down. The F-1 research reactor there was started up in December 1946 and recently marked its 60th anniversary in operation.
In 1954 the world's first nuclear powered electricity generator began operation in the then closed city of Obninsk at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (FEI). The AM-1 (Atom Mirny -- peaceful atom) reactor is water-cooled and graphite-moderated, with a design capacity of 30 MWt or 5 MWe. It was similar in principle to the plutonium production reactors in the closed military cities and served as a prototype for other graphite channel reactor designs including the Chernobyl-type RBMK (reaktor bolshoi moshchnosty kanalny -- high power channel reactor) reactors. AM-1 produced electricity until 1959 and was used until 2000 as a research facility and for the production of isotopes.
Also in the 1950s the FEI at Obninsk was developing fast breeder reactors (FBRs). In 1955 the BR-1 (bystry reaktor -- fast reactor) fast neutron reactor began operating. It produced no power but led directly to the BR-5 which started up in 1959 with a capacity of 5MWt which was used to do the basic research necessary for designing sodium-cooled FBRs. It was upgraded and modernised in 1973 and then underwent major reconstruction in 1983 to become the BR-10 with a capacity of 8 MWt which is now used to investigate fuel endurance, to study materials and to produce radioisotopes.
The BOR-60 fast reactor is operated by the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors (RIAR) at Dimitrovgrad, 1300 km SE of Moscow, along with six other research reactors. It started up in 1969 and is to be replaced about 2015 with a 100 MW sodium-cooled fast reactor. This will be a research reactor capable of testing lead, lead-bismuth and gas coolants as well as sodium, and running on MOX fuel. RIAR intends to set up an on-site closed fuel cycle, using pyrochemical reprocessing it has developed at pilot scale.
Public Opinion
An April 2008 survey carried out by the Levada Centre found that 72% of Russians were in favour of at least preserving the country's nuclear power capacity and 41% thought that nuclear was the only alternative to oil and gas as they deplete. Over half said that they were indignant about Soviet attempts to cover up news of the Chernobyl accident in 1986.
Non-proliferation
Russia is a nuclear weapons state, and a depository state of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) under which a safeguards agreement has been in force since 1985. The Additional Protocol was ratified in 2007. However, Russia takes the view that voluntary application of IAEA safeguards are not meaningful for a nuclear weapons state and so they are not generally applied. One exception is the BN-600 Beloyarsk-3 reactor which is safeguarded so as to give experience of such units to IAEA inspectors.
However, this policy is modified in respect to some uranium imports. All facilities where imported uranium under certain bilateral treaties goes must be on the list of those eligible and open to international inspection, and this overrides the voluntary aspect of voluntary offer agreements. It includes conversion plants, enrichment, fuel fabrication and nuclear power plants. Also the IUEC at Angarsk will be open to inspection.
Russia undertook nuclear weapons tests from 1949 to 1990.
The Soviet Union also used 116 nuclear explosions (81 in Russia) for geological research, creating underground gas storage, boosting oil and gas production and excavating reservoirs and canals. Most were in the 3-10 kiloton range and all occurred 1965-88.
Appendix:
Background: Soviet nuclear culture
In the 1950s and 1960s Russia seemed to be taking impressive steps to contest world leadership in civil development of nuclear energy. It had developed two major reactor designs, one from military plutonium production technology (the light water cooled graphite moderated reactor - RBMK), and one from naval propulsion units, very much as in USA (the VVER series - pressurised, water cooled and moderated). An ambitious plant, Atommash, to mass produce the latter design was taking shape near Volgodonsk, construction of numerous nuclear plants was in hand and the country had many skilled nuclear engineers.
But a technological arrogance developed, in the context of an impatient Soviet establishment. Then Atommash sunk into the Volga sediments, Chernobyl tragically vindicated western reactor design criteria, and the political structure which was not up to the task of safely utilising such technology fell apart. Atommash produced a total of only three reactor pressure vessels, instead of the eight per year intended. Then Chernobyl put the whole nuclear industry into a long standby. Russia was disgraced technologically, and this was exacerbated by a series of incidents in its nuclear-propelled navy contrasting with a near-impeccable safety record in the US Navy.
An early indication of the technological carelessness was substantial pollution followed by a major accident at Mayak Chemical Combine (then known as Chelyabinsk-40) near Kyshtym in 1957. The failure of the cooling system for a tank storing many tonnes of dissolved nuclear waste resulted in a non-nuclear explosion having a force estimated at about 75 tonnes of TNT (310 GJ). This killed 200 people and released some 740 PBq of radioactivity, affecting thousands more. Up to 1951 the Mayak plant had dumped its wastes into the Techa river, whose waters ultimately flow into the Ob River and Arctic Ocean. Then they were disposed of into Lake Karachay until at least 1953, when a storage facility for high-level wastes was built - the source of the 1957 accident. Finally, a 1967 duststorm picked up a lot of radioactive material from the dry bed of Lake Karachay and deposited it on to the surrounding province. The outcome of these three events made some 26,000 square kilometres the most radioactively-polluted area on Earth by some estimates, comparable with Chernobyl.
After Chernobyl there was a significant change of culture in the Russian civil nuclear establishment, at least at the plant level, and this change was even more evident in the countries of eastern Europe who saw the opportunity for technological emancipation from Russia. By the early 1990s a number of western assistance programs were in place which addressed safety issues and helped to alter fundamentally the way things were done in the eastern bloc, including Russia itself. Design and operating deficiencies were tackled, and a safety culture started to emerge. At the same time some R&D programs were suspended.
Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Association of Nuclear Operators contributed strongly to huge gains in safety and reliability of Soviet-era nuclear plants - WANO having come into existence as a result of Chrnobyl. In the first two years of WANO's existence, 1989-91, operating staff from every nuclear plant in the former Soviet Union visited plants in the west on technical exchange, and western personnel visited every FSU plant. A great deal of ongoing plant-to-plant cooperation, and subsequently a voluntary peer review program, grew out of these exchanges.
In March 2007 Russia signed a cooperation declaration with the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), bringing it much more into the mainstream of world nuclear industry development. Russia has been participating for some years in the NEA's work on reactor safety and nuclear regulation and is hosting an NEA project on reactor vessel melt-through. This agreement is expected to assist Russia's integration into the OECD.
Sources:
Prof V.Ivanov, WNA Symposium 2001, Prof A.Gagarinski and Mr A.Malyshev, WNA Symposium 2002.
Josephson, Paul R, 1999, Red Atom - Russia's nuclear power program from Stalin to today.
Minatom 2000, Strategy of Nuclear Power Development in Russia, see also Rosenergoatom web site
O. Saraev, paper at WNA mid-term meeting in Moscow, May 2003.
Rosenergoatom Bulletin 2002, esp. M.Rogov paper.
Perera, Judith 2003, Nuclear Power in the Former USSR, McCloskey, UK.
Kamenskikh, I, 2005, paper at WNA Symposium.
Kirienko, S. 2006, paper at World Nuclear Fuel Cycle conference, April and WNA Symposium, Sept.
Shchedrovitsky, P. 2007, paper at WNA Symposium, Sept.
Panov et al 2006, Floating Power Sources Based on Nuclear reactor Plants,