Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom

(April 2008)

The UK has 19 reactors generating one fifth of its electricity and all but one of these will be retired by 2023. New-generation plants are expected to be on line about 2017.
UK's first commercial nuclear power reactor began operating in 1956.
It has full fuel cycle facilities including major reprocessing plants.
Government commitment to the future of nuclear energy is firm due to energy security concerns as current reactors approach the end of operating life and the need to limit CO2 emissions.

UK electricity production is about 400 TWh gross, from 81 GWe capacity. Net imports are about 8 TWh. Annual consumption is 355 TWh, or about 5700 kWh/person.

In 2006 UK nuclear plants generated 19% of UK electricity (69 billion kWh of some 380 billion kWh net), compared with 36% from gas and 38% from coal. There are 19 UK reactors totalling 11 GWe capacity. In addition, about 3% of UK electricity demand is met by imports of nuclear power from France, so overall nuclear total in UK consumption is about 22%.

Government policy - power plants

British scientists were preeminent in the development of nuclear energy through to the early 1940s. This work was picked up again after the Second World War and while the USA was initially focused on reactors for marine propulsion, the world's first commercial-scale nuclear power reactor started up in UK in 1956.

In 1953 the government approved construction of the first reactors at Calder Hall. In 1955 a white paper announced the first purely commercial program, building up to 2000 MWe of Magnox capacity and investigating the future use of fast breeder reactors. Then the 1956 Suez crisis accentuated concerns about shortage of coal and oil and the nuclear program was trebled.

Until the 1980s, UK government policy was clearly to have nuclear energy providing an increasing proportion of UK electricity, with reprocessing of used fuel to recover fissile materials and increase the utilisation of uranium. In a 1988 white paper uncertainties were expressed about cost, though the value of nuclear power in other respects was acknowledged. In 1989 when the electricity system was privatised and deregulation began the government announced that it would keep all nuclear power generation in the public sector. Then in 1995 a review of nuclear power was published as a white paper, confirming the government's commitment to it but stating that no public sector support for building new nuclear plants was warranted in the deregulated market.

The nuclear generating plants apart from Magnox were transferred into the private sector in 1996, under British Energy. The state-owned British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) took ownership of all the Magnox power stations as well as the UK fuel cycle facilities. BNFL subsequently bought Westinghouse and other international nuclear engineering and services companies.

In March 2001 the UK electricity market took a major further step in deregulation and with considerable overcapacity due to recent construction of much gas-fired plant, wholesale prices declined to a level that was below production cost for British Energy. BE was saddled with expensive reprocessing contracts with BNFL (at 0.45 p/kWh - about six times what used fuel arrangements cost in USA) and also the climate change levy (at up to 0.15 p/kWh - though its nuclear plants do not emit CO₂). In 2003 the reprocessing contracts were renegotiated to give some relief, but this became contentious with the European Union.

Over 2003-05 BE was restructured extensively and the government ended up with a 64% share. In May 2007 the government sold this down to 39%, realising £2.08 billion. The proceeds went into the Nuclear Liabilities Fund to be applied to future decommissioning of BE's eight nuclear plants. (see later section) Further share sales down to about a 30% holding are envisaged.

New nuclear build

In 2006 a review of energy policy was undertaken, which put replacement of the country's nuclear power stations firmly back on the national agenda, due both to energy security concerns and the need to limit carbon emissions. Any new plants would be financed and built by the private sector - with internalised waste and decommissioning costs. To achieve this "the Government proposes to address potential barriers to new nuclear build" including design certification (by Health & Safety Executive, to have new procedures by early 2007) and streamlining planning permission for all large-scale energy infrastructure (a 2007 planning white paper). On electricity markets and their effect on major capital investment the report said almost nothing. The government is "committed to carbon pricing in the UK through the operation of the Emissions Trading Scheme", extending its scope and time frame. "We need a strengthened ETS" as a "credible long-term international framework for pricing carbon", and clearly much of the direction of new investment depends on this. Failing that, a UK substitute was hinted at.

In June 2006, the UK's Health & Safety Executive, which licenses nuclear reactors through its Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, suggested a two-stage licensing process similar to that in the USA. Considering 3rd generation reactors, a generic design authorisation for each type would be followed by site-specific licences. Stage 1 would focus on safety and take some three years, stage 2 would focus on the site and operator and take less than a year apart from planning permission. The UK Environment Agency reported similarly on the same day.

In February 2007 a judgement was brought against the government, notably the Department of Trade & Industry, that the public consultation process had been flawed. A further extended period of consultation took place and the Government's support for new nuclear build was confirmed in January 2008.

Areva had said that it could build new nuclear plants by 2017 if planning procedures were improved and government decisions were made on wastes. All but one of the nuclear plants now producing about 20% of UK electricity will close by 2023.

In November 2006 the Prime Minister told parliament that "in common with countries around the world, we need to put nuclear back on the agenda and at least replace the nuclear energy we will lose [from closing old plants]. Without it we will not be able to meet any of our objectives on climate change, or our objectives on energy security."

In May 2007 the UK Planning Review white paper set out proposals for streamlining approval for major infrastructure projects, including energy. It detached policy decisions from planning approvals and highlighted both the energy security challenge and the need to minimise carbon emissions in building 25-30 GWe of new capacity in the next two decades.

The Energy white paper which closely followed noted that security of supply was now a major challenge and that rising fossil fuel prices coupled with costs on carbon emissions had changed the economic picture for clean electricity generation. It proposed stronger international and UK constraints on carbon emissions, more efforts on energy conservation, and greater support for renewables - rising to £2 billion per year. Also, subject to the outcome of further consultation to October 2007, it gave clear support for investment by the private sector in nuclear power capacity, so that nuclear power could play a significant role in UK's energy future. Excluding it from the 30-35 GWe of new generating capacity would be incur high costs and major energy supply risks, it said.

In connection with emerging government policies on new nuclear build, early in 2007 British Energy called for private equity partners to help fund new nuclear plants. E.On and EdF both expressed interest in building new plants in the UK, and for practical reasons this would initially be on existing sites controlled by BE or British Nuclear Group.

As soon as the Energy white paper was published in May 2007, Westinghouse applied to the UK Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate for generic design assessment (GDA, or pre-licensing) of its AP1000 reactor design, based on its 2005 US design certification and supported by BE and E.On.

Areva NP, in conjunction with EdF, then applied for GDA of its 1600 MWe EPR design. Areva will also involve five other European utilities interested in building it in UK: British Energy, E.On, Iberdrola, RWE npower and Suez. This will mean that all six utilities will be up to speed and able to support any site licence application for EPR units, though only EdF will share costs of the GDA with Areva. EdF has said that it wants to build several EPR units in the UK. The EPR received French design approval in 2004.

GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy has also applied for GDA of its ESBWR type, supported by Iberdrola, RWE npower and BE. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd also applied for GDA for its ACR-1000 design but later withdrew it to concentrate on Canadian projects.

The assessments will be done by experts belonging to the nuclear regulators - the Health and Safety Executive (including its Office for Civil Nuclear Security) and the Environment Agency. Each full GDA will cost up to £10 million and take some 3.5 years in total. In March 2008 the two bodies said that all four designs had passed preliminary review for GDA. The next stage of the GDA requires prioritising by the end of April which designs "are most likely to be to be progressed for licensing and construction," with no more than three proceeding.

In March the government announced that GDA for Areva's EPR design would proceed in close collaboration with ASN, the French regulator in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of assessment work already done elsewhere. The prospect of working similarly with US, Canadian and other regulators was mentioned.

Separately, British Energy has said that it would support all four GDA applications and that it was conducting its own review of reactor designs from the four vendors which had submitted documentation to the regulator. It controls many of the likely sites for new plants and has said that all of its sites would be suitable for new build, even considering possible sea level rise due to climate change. It has made transmission connection agreements with National Grid for possible new nuclear plants at Sizewell, Dungeness, Bradwell and Hinkley. The first three are in the southeast of England, with Hinkley in the southwest. The agreements will facilitate appropriate grid connections for a range of possible reactor types to be in place from 2016 onwards.

Early in 2008 the new White Paper on Nuclear Power put nuclear energy at the heart of the UK government's response to the need for secure, safe, affordable, low-carbon energy supplies. The Prime Minister framed the new policy in terms of taking "determined long-term action to reduce carbon emissions," using "nuclear power [as] a tried and tested technology [which] has provided the UK with secure supplies of safe, low-carbon electricity for half a century."

"Set against the challenges of climate change and security of supply, the evidence in support of new nuclear power stations is compelling," according to the minister introducing the white paper. The government invited energy companies to bring forward plans to build and operate new nuclear power plants alongside other low-carbon technologies including renewables, as well as possibly carbon capture and storage from fossil fuelled generation. Some 30-35 GWe of new generating capacity will be required in the next two decades, most of it base-load.

The government itself will take active steps to open up the way for construction of new nuclear power stations by addressing siting assessment criteria and progressing the Generic Design Assessment of new reactors over three years to 2011. However, it was careful to stress that "it will be for energy companies to fund, develop and build new nuclear power stations in the UK, including meeting the full costs of decommissioning and … waste management." These measures are being addressed in a new Energy Bill before parliament.

After many years of incoherence, radioactive waste management policy is developing on a separate track, with wastes from new plants likely to end up in a single national repository. A further white paper is to set out a framework for implementing deep underground storage and disposal. See also later section.

In March 2008 the government will call for justification applications required under EU law to establish that any nuclear facility would bring benefits that outweigh any possible health detriment. Meanwhile it has published an analysis of options by way of an Impact Assessment of the Government's White Paper on Nuclear Power and the 192-page white paper itself deals thoroughly with a wide range of inputs to the long consultation process.

The UK will work to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to provide continuing incentive for investment in all low-carbon technologies, and if necessary it will introduce further measures to reinforce it. However, the government was confident that the basic economics of nuclear power were attractive both for investors and the wider economy. Furthermore the carbon abatement cost with nuclear is only £0.3/tCO2 compared with onshore wind (the next cheapest) at £50/tCO2.

The government's cost-benefit analysis used a figure of £1250/kW for overnight capital cost and estimated that a first of a kind 1600 MWe plant would cost £2.8 billion.

With the measures announced, a pre-development and planning period of 5.5 years is envisaged, so that construction of new nuclear plants could commence in mid 2013. Several could be in operation by 2020. The levelised cost of generation is then 3.64 pence/kWh. Following the announcement, Areva said that with 11 top European utilities (notably EdF)* supporting pre-licensing of its 1600 MWe EPR units in UK, it hoped to build at least four and possibly six of them there.

* But also E.On, British Energy, Centrica, Iberdrola, RWE, Scottish & Southern Energy, Endesa, Suez, Union Fenosa and Vattenfall.

Reactor development

The UK Atomic Energy Authority (AEA), set up in 1954, was the initial body responsible for nuclear plants (as well as research), and it was the UKAEA which commissioned the first plants in the 1950s.* However this role was later taken over by the Central Electricity Generation Board in England and Wales, and the South of Scotland Electricity Board - both utilities.

* The decision to build the particular kind of reactor at Calder Hall was taken very early in the light of their intended role for producing weapons-grade plutonium while serving as prototypes for power generation, despite frequent fuel changes. Also there was no spare enrichment capacity for power generation and any civil program had to rely on readily available materials such as graphite for moderator, CO₂ for heat transfer and Magnox (MAGnesium Non-OXidising) cladding for natural uranium fuel.

The first eight Magnox reactors were small prototypes and initially dual-purpose, combining power generation with plutonium production for military purposes. However, the latter function was soon taken over by other facilities at Windscale, and these Magnox reactors were reconfigured to provide power only. They use natural uranium metal fuel, have a graphite moderator and are cooled with carbon dioxide. Magnox fuel is so called because of its magnesium alloy cladding, and the chemical reactivity of this means that the fuel cannot be stored indefinitely but must be reprocessed.

Subsequent Magnox units were progressively scaled up tenfold and optimised for continuous electricity production. They use natural uranium metal fuel, have a graphite moderator and are cooled with carbon dioxide. The thermal efficiency was initially very low - 22% for the first single-use ones and this rose to 28% for later ones of the 26 built in UK. Two were sold to Japan and Italy, and similar units were built in France.

The Magnox units were originally licensed for 30 years, but in some cases this was extended to 50 years, reflecting their robust engineering. However, on economic grounds all will be closed by 2011. The last four in operation at Wylfa and Oldbury have massive concrete pressure vessels and the steam generators are located inside these, giving enhanced safety. However, the Oldbury units in particular have had problems with graphite weight loss. They are due to close finally at the end of 2008.

Power reactors operating in UK

Reactors	Type	Net capacity each	Start Operation	Expected shutdown
Oldbury 1 & 2	Magnox	217 MWe	1968	Dec 2008
Wylfa 1 & 2	Magnox	490 MWe	1971-72	Dec 2010
Dungeness B 1 & 2	AGR	545 MWe	1985-86	2018
Hartlepool 1 & 2	AGR	595 MWe	1984-85	2014
Heysham 1 & 2	AGR	615 MWe	1985-86	2014
Heysham 3 & 4	AGR	615 MWe	1988-89	2023
Hinkley Point B 1 & 2	AGR	620 & 600 MWe*	1976-78	2016
Hunterston B 1 & 2	AGR	610 & 605 MWe*	1976-77	2016
Torness 1 & 2	AGR	625 MWe	1988-89	2023
Sizewell B	PWR	1196 MWe	1995	2035
Total (19)		11,035 MWe

* running at 70% power indefinitely.

The second generation is Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGR), based on a prototype which started up at Windscale in 1962. In 1964 the AGR was adopted as the UK standard and 14 were built at seven sites, starting up 1976-89. The type is exclusive to UK. They are also graphite moderated and carbon dioxide cooled, but use enriched oxide fuel which is burned up to low levels (relative to LWR fuel). They have a high thermal efficiency - around 40%, due to very high coolant temperatures - well over 600°C (double the figure of most reactors). However, each pair was a unique design so there was little standardisation, and operational problems were significant. Like the Magnox units, they were designed and built by private industrial nuclear power consortia as complete power stations.

In 1978 the decision was made to build an initial Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). This large Westinghouse unit started up in 1995 and was intended to be the first of four. It is typical of much of the world capacity, but newer and more complex than most PWRs.

The UK Atomic Energy Authority has operated two fast neutron (breeder) reactors at Dounreay, including the 254 MWe Prototype Fast Reactor from 1974 to 1994.

In 2006 BE closed four AGRs on account of boiler degradation in the non-nuclear part of the plants. It was intended to restart the units after a few months, but in the event approval was not given until May 2007. All four will operate at about 60% capacity but BE intends to increase this to 70%. A December 2007 decision on 5-year life extension for the units to 2016 involved a commitment to spend £90 million - beyond a current £150 million program - to achieve this. A further life extension will be considered in 2013, and is likely if electricity prices stay high. Life extensions for other AGR plants will be considered at least three years before the scheduled closure of each unit.

Late in 2007 corrosion was found in the structures of two AGRs, and these plus two similar ones were then closed pending fuller assessment.

Fuel cycle facilities and materials

From the outset, the UK has been self-sufficient in conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing and waste treatment. Uranium is imported.

In 1971, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) was formed from UKAEA and provided a range of fuel cycle services. In 2004 many of the functions were taken over by its subsidiary, British Nuclear Group.

A 6000t/yr conversion plant is at Springfields, managed by Westinghouse under contract to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. Early in 2005 Cameco Corporation bought ten years of toll conversion services from 2006, at 5000 tU/yr. Feed will be from Cameco's Blind River refinery in Ontario, Canada.

Enrichment is undertaken by Urenco at Capenhurst in a 1.1 million SWU/yr centrifuge plant, the first part of which dates from 1976. This was earlier the site of a very large diffusion enrichment plant mainly for defence purposes. Urenco is part owned by the British government, which has indicated that the 33% share is for sale, valued at some £2.5 billion.

Fuel fabrication of Magnox, AGR and PWR fuel is at Springfields, and other PWR fuel is bought on the open market. The last batch of Magnox fuel will be made in 2007 and loaded in 2009-10.

Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication for export is at the Sellafield MOX plant (SMP), which was built with 120 t/yr design capacity and started production in 2001, but was then downrated to 40 t/yr. (The MOX Demonstration Facility was a small-scale plant to produce commercial MOX fuel for light water reactors. The plant was commissioned between 1992 and 1994, and until 1999 produced fuel for use in Switzerland, Germany and Japan. It was recommissioned in 2002 to support the SMP.)

In 2007 TVEL contracted to supply fuel pellets made with reprocessed uranium at its MSZ Elektrostal plant in Russia to BE's Sizewell B PWR plant. The fuel assemblies will be made at Areva NP's fabrication plant in Lingen, Germany. The deal is for one reload, for delivery in 2009. (TVEL/MSZ and Areva NP (formerly Siemens) have been partners in fuel fabrication since 1994 and have delivered annually 100 tonnes of fuel fabricated under an Areva/Siemens license to nine or ten nuclear units in Europe.)

Reprocessing is undertaken by Sellafield Ltd for International Nuclear Services at Sellafield under contract to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. A 1500 t/yr plant which opened in 1964 treats the Magnox (metal) fuel, this is due to close soon after 2012, after all the Magnox reactors close. (Magnox fuel, due to the chemical reactivity of the cladding, cannot be stored indefinitely.) The 850 t/yr THORP plant commissioned in 1994 and costing £1850 million takes oxide fuel, predominantly for international customers. Of the 2160 tonnes of AGR fuel committed to reprocessing by BNFL/BNG, only about half has so far been reprocessed. As of mid 2007, 1500 tonnes of AGR fuel was scheduled to be reprocessed in THORP, and a further 4500 tonnes arising to the end of the AGR operating lifetimes was programmed to be stored. THORP could also reprocess the 1000 tonnes of fuel from Sizewelll B PWR, but has not been contracted to do so.

A pipe failure discovered in April 2005 inside a hot cell raised questions about the future of the plant. The pipe was carrying dissolved spent fuel in nitric acid. The 83,000 litre spill was contained in the cell but the incident was provisionally rated 3 on the International Nuclear Event Scale - a serious incident without off-site radiological consequences. The spilled liquid was recovered in June, and BNG was fined £500,000 in October 2006. The Chief Inspector of nuclear installations acknowledged that while there had been no harm to workers or the public, it nevertheless represented a major operational lapse which would not be tolerated. The plant is ready to reopen but is awaiting regulatory approval for this.

The UK Atomic Energy Authority formerly operated a small reprocessing plant at Dounreay for research reactor fuel.

In UK, recycling plutonium has not been regarded as economic, so separated plutonium has been stored indefinitely. (MOX fuel costs about five times as much to fabricate as conventional uranium oxide fuel, which doubles the total fuel cost.)

In June 2007 a report for the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) focused on the 100 tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium and 60,000 tonnes reprocessed and depleted uranium which will be available by 2012. The uranium is of three kinds: UF₆ depleted uranium tails from enrichment (25,000t), Magnox depleted uranium from reprocessing Magnox used fuel (30,000t) and normal reprocessed uranium from reprocessing oxide fuels (5000t). Three options are considered: treating the materials as wastes destined for deep geological disposal, storing them long-term, or using them as fuel (or selling them others for this purpose). In the last case, the energy content is enough to run 3 GWe of new PWR reactors for 60 years, or 12 GWe of fast reactors for 700 years. The Uranium and Plutonium: Macro-economic Study provides an economic analysis of the options. It makes no recommendations but notes that the waste option is lowest undiscounted cost with low uranium prices and re-use is profitable above about US$ 80/lb U₃O₈ price.

A September 2007 report from the Royal Society recommended that the 100 tonnes of plutonium be used as MOX fuel and that a new MOX fabrication plant be built to expedite this.

In October 2007, a follow-on report for NDA provided an economic analysis of the options outlined in the earlier materials report. Spent Fuel management: Life Cycle Analysis Model looks further at the three options and shows that at current uranium prices the reprocessing and re-use option was economically best.

Government policy - fuel cycle organization and the NDA

In February 2008 the UK became the 21st member of the Global Nuclear Energy partnership (GNEP), indicating a fresh approach to its whole nuclear power sector and a willingness to play a significant role globally. The UK had been a notable absentee from GNEP ranks and the country's inclusion means the partnership now includes all the countries that pioneered nuclear power in the 1950s, all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, all the major uranium exporters and - with the exception of India - all the countries with reprocessing facilities.

Since 1971 British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) has controlled the main part of the UK nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In 2004 BNFL became essentially a two-business company: Fuel Manufacture and Reactor Services through Westinghouse, and British Nuclear Group (BNG ) with three main business units: Nuclear Decommissioning & Cleanup (later: Project Services Ltd), Spent Fuel & Engineering (later: Sellafield Ltd) and Magnox Generation - the last two becoming contractors to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA).

Westinghouse was sold to Toshiba early in 2006. This left all the back end functions and liabilities with BNG as the main remnant of BNFL.

In October 2006 BNFL's specific plans to sell BNG piecemeal by tender in 2007 were approved by the government. The only part of BNG not for sale is Nexia Solutions, which will be the basis of a new national nuclear laboratory. The prime part of the disposal is the 5-year contract with the government's NDA to run and clean up Sellafield, the site of all UK's back end of fuel cycle activities, and Sellafield Ltd was accordingly spun off from BNG. The new contract will be awarded in 2008-9 and the NDA will be involved in selecting the buyer. Earlier, US-based Fluor offered up to £400 million for the whole BNG enterprise.

Sellafield Ltd manages operations and cleanup on the Sellafield and Capenhurst sites on behalf of NDA. These take in most of the former BNFL facilities, notably the THORP and Magnox reprocessing facilities and the new Sellafield MOX plant. Once the initial contracts end, it will have to compete to keep the work, and as of October 2007, NDA was negotiating with four bidders for the work. The relationship between the NDA and Sellafield Ltd is much the same as between the US Department of Energy and its contractors.

Sellafield Ltd promptly set up International Nuclear Services Ltd (INS), 51% owned by it and 49% by the NDA, as a customer interface, to manage used fuel reprocessing and MOX supply contracts for more than 20 utility customers and to transport nuclear fuel products to customers. In 2007 NDA announced that it would fully take over INS from April 2008.

In March 2007 BNFL announced that Project Services Ltd, part of BNG, was being sold. This is the specialist nuclear decommissioning business which operates in the UK, continental Europe, FSU and Japan.

In June 2007 BNFL sold its Reactor Sites Management Company (RSMC) business, part of BNG,to Energy Solutions of the USA. The sale included Magnox Electric, a wholly-owned subsidiary of RSMC, which holds the contracts and licences to manage ten nuclear sites with 22 reactors in the UK to operate and decommission on behalf of the NDA. Magnox Electric is split into two, a northern region which carries out electricity generation (on two sites), defuelling and decommissioning, while the southern region undertakes defuelling and decommissioning operations. The NDA will renew these contacts separately.

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA ) itself was set up and funded under the 2004 Energy Act. It is charged with cleaning up the UK's legacy of nuclear wastes on 20 sites including 39 reactors, 5 fuel reprocessing plants as well as other fuel cycle and research facilities. These were the responsibility of BNG (the decommissioning and clean-up arm of BNFL) and the UKAEA, but in April 2005 NDA took over all designated liabilities and assets from those bodies. BNG became manager and contractor to the NDA. The assets include plants and BNFL's decommissioning funds. The undiscounted cost is expected to total some £73 billion over many years, with more than £1 billion per year required for the first 10-15 years. The NDA has an annual budget of £2.8 billion per year, with over £1 billion of this offset by operational revenue.

Legacy Wastes and Decommissioning - Funding

At the end of 2001 the government announced that it would set up an Authority to handle "the clean-up of the legacy created by the early years of Britain's military and civil nuclear programs". In particular it would take over all of the public sector civil nuclear liabilities held by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (estimated at £7 billion) and most of those held by BNFL (£35 billion), together with all BNFL's assets at Sellafield*, Capenhurst, Springfields, Drigg and the elderly Magnox reactors which came under BNFL's wing in 1998. The assets would include the "substantial" revenue stream from the THORP reprocessing plant and the MOX plant at Sellafield.

* The Sellafield site was originally a WWII munitions factory, then a military plutonium production facility. It includes closed-down plant dating from the 1940s.

In mid 2002 the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) published its white paper on managing the UK's nuclear legacy wastes including plants or sites used partly for defence purposes early on. In 1986 the government had accepted full financial responsibility for liabilities arising from the UKAEA's R&D programs, through DTI and Defence.

Estimates of the total overall cost of civilian nuclear clean-up in the UK have now reached over £70 billion as the NDA gains a greater knowledge of the scope of the tasks. Of that enormous eventual 'bill', the Sellafield and Drigg sites represent about half, the Magnox reactors about a quarter and Dounreay about a tenth. The rest is split across other UKAEA sites. The waste management portion is slightly greater than the decommissioning share.

A number of financial arrangements have been made over the years to establish decommissioning funds.

On BNFL sites, some £6.7 billion of the cost was covered by commercial contracts, £4.8 billion was funded through the Magnox undertaking (a government provision in 1998 when BNFL took over the Magnox reactors), £8 billion was funded by the taxpayer via UKAEA and Defence, and the balance fell to BNFL itself. Following the 2002 white paper, BNFL made £2.35 billion provision in its accounts for dealing with management of historic wastes at Sellafield and for early closure of its eight oldest Magnox reactors - at Calder Hall and Chapelcross. All these were to be taken over by the new Authority, along with financial assets of £9.0 billion.

For what became British Energy, some funds were set aside over the years - £3.5 billion for reprocessing/ wastes in the 1995 accounts, and since 1996, some £2 billion was set aside towards long-term liabilities. In 2003 BE showed £3.9 billion in accrued nuclear liabilities. All these monies were in companies' own audited accounts, not in an external trust fund. (see also re BE decommissioning, below)

Radioactive Wastes

Most UK radioactive wastes are a legacy of the pioneering development of nuclear power, rather than being normal operational wastes arising from electricity generation - though there is a significant amount of these.

Solid low-level wastes are disposed of in a 120 ha repository at Drigg in Cumbria, near Sellafield, which has operated since 1959. In 2008 the NDA awarded a 5-year £125 million management contract for this to the UK Nuclear Waste Management consortium led by URS Corp's Washington Division and involving Studsvik, Areva and Serco. The contract involves developing a full UK strategy for low-level waste management including decommissioning wastes.

Intermediate-level waste is stored at Sellafield and other source sites, pending disposal.

Used fuel is sent to Sellafield for reprocessing. High-level wastes arising from this are stored and some have been vitrified there, these being stored in stainless steel canisters in silos. All HLW is to be stored for 50 years before disposal, to allow cooling.

Until 1982 some low and intermediate-level wastes were disposed of in deep ocean sites. In 1993 the government accepted an international ban on this.

Some radioactivity in effluents is discharged from Sellafield into the sea. After BNFL invested £750 million in new treatment plants in the 1980s, these were reduced to about 1% of previous levels, and remain within regulatory limits.

After several years research & development, BNFL in 2004 commenced an effluent treatment innovation at Sellafield which has cut discharges of Tc-99 from the site by 90%. Trials in 2003 showed 95% removal of Tc-99 from the waste stream from Magnox used fuel reprocessing, the major source of the radionuclide which is also used as an environmental tracer - making its presence discernable well beyond the Irish Sea. No adverse health effects, nor regulatory infringement, occurred with previous marine discharges of Tc-99, but concerns were expressed from Ireland and Norway. The new treatment uses TPP (tetraphenylphosphonium bromide) to complex the Tc-99 in the medium active concentrate treatment plant discharge so that it is stored as a solid. Using this process has enabled accelerated processing and reduction of radioactive liquid wastes on site.

Radioactive Waste Management Policy

The UK government has been advised since 1978 by its Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee but this was replaced in 2004 by the non-expert but widely-representative Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) which was charged with again reviewing the options for long-term storage and disposal of high-activity wastes.

In 2006 CoRWM reported after three years' deliberation on what to do with UK high-level nuclear wastes. It recommended deep geological disposal of high and intermediate-level wastes long-term with early closure of the repository, but meanwhile "robust interim storage" is needed. The scope of investigation covered an eventual 470,000 cubic metres of mostly high and intermediate-level wastes and also the implications of possibly treating plutonium and depleted uranium as wastes, and of possibly abandoning any reprocessing of used fuel.

Repository location would be on basis of community agreement, and about one third of the UK appears to be geologically suitable. In relation to siting, communities should be provided with incentives to volunteer, as in other countries. CoRWM's final report in July 2006 addressed questions such as retrievability, but only in principle, while CoRWM said that the government should move swiftly to implement its recommendations, though it acknowledges that actually commissioning a repository could take decades. The government accepted CoRWM's key recommendations and said that a new committee with the same name would be set up to give continuing advice on implementing them.

The new CoRWM was announced in October 2007, with expert membership related to the task of planning for geological disposal of wastes in line with the earlier key recommendations.

UK Nirex Ltd (originally the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Management Executive) was formed in 1982 to develop an intermediate-level waste disposal facility, with shares held by British Energy, BNFL, the UK Atomic Energy Authority and the government. It carried out detailed studies and in 1994 sought permission to construct an underground rock laboratory to investigate the suitability of strata near Sellafield for deep geological disposal. Permission was refused three years latter.

Under plans announced in 2003, the government assumed control of Nirex and gave it independence from the nuclear industry in order to achieve greater transparency for its endeavours. Its independence was part of wider reforms such as the establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to deal with legacy nuclear installations and sites.

In October 2006 the government announced that NDA would take over Nirex in line with its mandate for storage and eventual geological disposal of higher activity wastes. Since March 2007, NDA has also been responsible for developing a national strategy for the disposal of nuclear industry Low Level Waste (LLW) and ensuring the availability of facilities for this.

In April 2007 the NDA established the Radioactive Waste Management Directorate (RWMD). The RWMD will set up a subsidiary of the NDA to devise "a safe, environmentally sound, publicly acceptable, geological disposal solution" for the UK's high-level wastes - civil and military. This could eventually develop into the site licence company and implement their geological disposal once a suitable repository site has been selected with public participation. Integration of Nirex skills and expertise was then complete so that the NDA has taken over its functions.

The NDA is making plans for a deep geological repository for high- and intermediate-level wastes. This is expected to cost £7.5 billion from conception to closure in 2100. In June 2007 a public consultation on siting criteria was launched, the concept including "partnerships with potential host communities that allow issues and opportunities to be fully discussed and evaluated."

The NDA is also responsible for the Drigg low-level waste site and in October 2007 was in the final stages of selecting a new contractor to operate it.

Legacy Wastes and Decommissioning - Funding

* The Sellafield site was originally a WWII munitions factory, then a military plutonium production facility. It includes closed-down plant dating from the 1940s.

A number of financial arrangements have been made over the years to establish decommissioning funds.

In February 2008 the UK government published its proposed arrangements for management and disposal of future nuclear wastes. Power plant operators will need to demonstrate detailed and costed plans for decommissioning, waste management and disposal before they begin construction. Then they will need to set aside funds progressively into a secure and independent fund in much the same way as most other countries. The government will set a "fixed unit price for disposal of intermediate-level wastes and spent fuel," which "will include a significant risk premium" and escalate with inflation. The government will then take title to the wastes and accept liability for disposing of them. A new Nuclear Liabilities Financing Assurance Board is to be set up in 2008 to advise the government in relation to each proposal and setting the fees. It will have a strong actuarial function.
Operators will need to make their own arrangements regarding disposal of low-level operational wastes, and fund that as they go along. All other waste and decommissioning costs will be met from the Independent Fund set up by each operator for each plant. The fixed unit price will be paid into each fund and form part of its corpus alongside other provisions. Mid-2009 is given as the earliest date that generic fixed unit price figures for intermediate- and high-level wastes will be available to aspiring operators. Final figures will then be negotiated in the light of specific proposals.

Power Reactor Decommissioning

The government in 1995 determined that decommissioning should be undertaken as soon as reasonably practicable, the rate of dismantling being determined by a variety of factors. Experience so far among the following reactors has shown that costs are lower than originally predicted.

Decommissioned power reactors in UK

Reactors	Type	MWe each	Shut down
Berkeley 1 & 2	Magnox	138	1988-89
Bradwell 1 & 2	Magnox	123	2002
Calder Hall 1-4	Magnox	50	2003
Chapelcross 1-4	Magnox	49	2004
Dungeness A 1 & 2	Magnox	225	2006
Hinkley Pt 1 & 2	Magnox	235	2000
Hunterston A 1 & 2	Magnox	160	1989-90
Sizewell A 1 & 2	Magnox	210	2006
Trawsfynydd 1 & 2	Magnox	196	1993
Windscale	AGR	28	1981
Dounreay PFR	FBR	254	1994
Winfrith	SGHWR	92	1990
Total: 21

In 2006 the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate gave formal consent to decommission Sizewell-A and Dungeness A power stations, both 40 years old and which were closed at the end of 2006. They will be defuelled by 2009 and site decommissioning is scheduled for 2110-11, though this may be brought forward. The remaining two Magnox power stations - the only ones with prestressed concrete pressure vessels (rather than steel) - are due to close in 2008 and 2010.

However, part of the long-term problem in UK is that costs for decommissioning gas-cooled reactors are much higher per unit of capacity than for light water reactors - at least five times for Magnox. This is due to the large volume of material and the need to dispose of a lot of graphite moderator. Decommissioning waste volumes per unit capacity for Magnox are ten times those for western light water reactors.

The Nuclear Generation Decommissioning Fund was set up to ensure a secure source of funds for eventual decommissioning of nuclear power plants operated by BE. BE was the only contributor to the fund, to which final payment would have been made in 2035 or whenever Sizewell B was closed down. In 2001 the Trustees of the Fund reported that its value matched its liabilities.

Upon privatisation of BE, the Fund received £228 million on account of the decommissioning liabilities of BE's predecessors and in recognition of sums that CEGB and NE had paid Treasury for that. In March 2004 the Fund was £440 million and BE estimated the undiscounted cost of decommissioning its plants as £5.1 billion - most not required until many years hence.

With the reconstruction of BE in 2004 the assets of the Fund were passed over to the new Nuclear Liabilities Fund into which BE makes both fixed payments and pays 65% of its annual net cash flow. This latter fund is administered by the NDA and is primarily for cleaning up UK's legacy wastes rather than decommissioning BE's plants.

In 2007 BNFL sold the management company responsible for all the Magnox sites (10) except Sellafield to Energy Solutions, a US company incorporating a BNG subsidiary. It will manage them until NDA awards further contracts separately for the northern and southern five sites. Decommissioning is expected to cost about £1 billion per site.

The government has announced a Nuclear Liabilities Financing Assurance Board (NLFAB) to provide independent scrutiny and advice on the suitability of the decommissioning programs submitted by operators of new nuclear power stations.

R&D

The UK has had a strong history of nuclear R&D. Some of this is described above.

In 2007 it was announced that BNFL subsidiary Nexia Solutions and the British Technology Centre at Sellafield would be combined to form a new National Nuclear Laboratory.

Regulation and safety

The principal regulating provision in the UK is the Nuclear Installations Act 1965, which governs the construction and safe operation of nuclear plants. This is administered by the Health and Safety Executive's Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII).

This act is supported by the Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985, which require employers to keep radiation exposure of workers and the public as low as practicable and within specified limits. The Nuclear Generating Stations (Security) Regulations 1996 and the Radioactive Material (Road Transport) Act 1991 are also relevant.

Waste management and discharges to the environment are regulated by the Radioactive Substances Act 1993.

Public opinion

UK public opinion on the question of maintaining the share of electricity provided by nuclear power by building new reactors reversed from 20% support and 60% oppose in July 2001, to 41% for and 28% against in November 2005 and 65% support for new build at end of 2007.

In Parliament to September 2006 there was a substantial increase in support for building replacement nuclear capacity among ruling Labour members. Opposition declined accordingly. Overall 61% of MPs supported new nuclear build and 22% opposed, while 66% said nuclear should be a major contributor to UK 's energy future and 81% thought it will be. Of Labour MPs, 60% supported new nuclear build (up from 35% in 2005) and 80% of Conservative MPs did so.

By July 2007 the support had strengthened among both Labour and Conservative MPs to 72% overall and the opposition rose to 23%, based on concerns about wastes, costs and competition with renewables.

The reasons for MP support in 2006 were energy security (37%), realisation that renewables won't fill the gap (18%), reduce dependence on fossil fuels (15%), a good safety record (15%) and the need for balanced energy policy (12%) with very little difference between the parties except on the last, where Conservatives were stronger. Implementing effective policies on nuclear wastes before proceeding with new build was seen as necessary by 78% of MPs, but only 28% believed that there is already "a clear way forward" on this. Regarding MPs' trusted sources of information on nuclear energy, academics rated 83%, nuclear industry leaders 51%, environmentalists 44% and media 24%.

Wider Industry Support

In April 2006, the Confederation of British Industry issued a strong call for the UK government to clarify its longer-term carbon emission policy so that low-emission sources such as nuclear power could play a proper role. The CBI said that companies will seriously consider investing in capital-intensive new nuclear build without the need for government subsidy if the right long-term non-discriminatory policy framework is in place. Some £50 billion is required to refurbish UK's generating infrastructure by 2020 with low-carbon sources, but at present the policy context beyond 2012 is unclear.

The CBI pointed out that nuclear "is the only low-carbon technology proven to deliver a consistent supply of electricity on a large scale. And it can contribute strongly to more secure UK energy supplies, given the substantial uranium reserves available in politically stable countries and the ability to store significant uranium stocks. The operating costs of nuclear power are far more stable than for fossil fuels, because fuel only accounts for 5-10 per cent of generating costs." Nuclear wastes are no reason to avoid new investment in nuclear.

The CBI also addressed the UK's planning paralysis: "A planning process designed in the middle of the last century is hampering the ability of business to deliver the energy projects needed today and in the future. From renewable energy schemes to desperately-needed gas storage facilities, the system is failing to give proper priority to energy projects. Government must not take its eye off the ball. We got away with it this winter but may not be so lucky next time. An energy policy based on crossing fingers and the use of the prayer mat is not acceptable for the fifth biggest economy on Earth."

Non-proliferation

The UK is a nuclear weapons state, party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it ratified in 1968 and under which a safeguards agreement has been in force since 1972. The Additional Protocol in relation to this was signed in 1998. IAEA safeguards are applied on all civil nuclear activities. (The UK undertook 45 nuclear weapons tests over 1952-91 - most in the 1950s).

References:
Dept of Trade & Industry 1998, Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom.
OECD/NEA 2003, Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants.
Nuclear Issues Nov 2005.
DTI 2007, Energy White paper and Consultation document.
Taylor, S., 2007, Privatisation and Financial Collapse in the Nuclear Industry - the origins and causes of the British Energy crisis of 2002. Routledge.

NDA 2007, Uranium and Plutonium: Macro-economic Study.